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
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### **FOREWORD**




Since the 2021 publication of the MARFORRES Campaign Plan 2030, the world has witnessed significant, far-reaching events, many of which serve to challenge previously accepted notions or tenets of international relations and levers of national power. A confluence of bad-actor behavior and unforeseen global health and economic challenges directly constrained (and constrains) the ability of governments to promote prosperity for their people, both individually as independent nations and collectively as a global society.

However, the Marine Corps has remained active while shifting global geopolitics continue to evolve. An aggressive Campaign of Learning in support of Service-level Force Design efforts has produced significant results. Establishment of the newly designed Marine Littoral Regiment construct in Okinawa and Hawaii, to include the ongoing reorganization of III Marine Expeditionary Force and the repositioning of forces throughout the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of operations, have met the Commandant's prescribed initial milestones. Investment in vital new platforms and technologies within the portfolio of unmanned systems, sensing, and kill webs continue to generate Congressional support. In contrast, integrating these new capabilities into emerging modernized doctrine, such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Stand-In Forces, and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, continues to mature. The Marine Corps delivers such capabilities and capacities by practicing and experimenting against real-world challenges to advance our concepts and contribute to both gray-zone activities and competition.

The Marine Corps Reserve, as an active partner in the Total Force, has made significant achievements in support of Service goals, as articulated in this Campaign Plan Update. To that end, we have endeavored to collaborate with all elements of Headquarters Marine Corps, in addition to adjacent Marine Forces (MARFORs) and warfighting Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), to pursue the Commandant's Force Design vision. Results include the establishment of the promising new Marine Innovation Unit (MIU), laying the foundation for the development of new Littoral Craft Companies, and repositioning numerous units throughout the U.S. to better support the long-term demographics and retention of our most valued Reserve Marines. By putting our talent to work, our investment in the individual Marine continues to pay dividends despite recruitment and retention challenges imposed by the post-COVID environment. We continue to mature our partnerships with II MEF and Marine Forces Special Operations Command, and we have greatly furthered Reserve Component Global Force Management integration with supported Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management (GFM) process. Lastly, our efforts to exploit the opportunities generated through the staff integration with Marine Corps Forces, South (MARFORSOUTH), enabling access to the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of operations, has facilitated numerous achievements in our stated Competition and Innovation Lines of Operations.

The threats to our Nation and our allies are real. Our adversaries are committed to undermining U.S. global presence and influence. While supporting all Marine Corps efforts to modernize capabilities and remain relevant to the Joint Force, the Reserve Force must also continue to evolve. Our focus will remain on the ideological and physical investment in our people, for they will deliver the prescribed Marine Corps capabilities for the next century. And they, and their successors, will build the combat capacity required to win our Nation's battles, and quite possibly in the face of a highly capable enemy on a modern battlefield. Any commitment less than that only weakens our resolve and risks future generations' lives. Semper Fidelis.

Lieutenant General D. G. Bellon, USMC Commander, Marine Forces Reserve Commander, Marine Forces, South



To build upon the thoughts shared in the Commander's Foreword, this Update is designed to share knowledge gained through our intellectual rigor with internal and external audiences. Considered refined Commander's Guidance, this document describes (1) what we have learned and accomplished since implementation and (2) where we endeavor to go based upon what we believe to be the future of Force Design, the Marine Corps Reserve, and MARFORSOUTH. We will also demonstrate how MARFORSOUTH integration has quickly achieved meaningful results by showcasing the opportunities presented by using USSOUTHCOM as the "theater of innovation" for the Marine Corps. Further, the recent relocation of MARFORSOUTH from Doral, Florida, to New Orleans has contributed to USSOUTHCOM's long-term success of campaigning and global Integrated Deterrence. As the base movement in deliberate partnerships with Naval Forces South/Commander, 4th Fleet (NAVSO/C4F), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in the USSOUTHCOM Area Of Responsibility (AOR), MARFORRES will be more ready and responsive, significantly improving the ability to integrate with and contribute to the Joint Force, while also fulfilling Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) objectives.

Since the Commandant revealed his vision for Force Design 2030 (FD2030) several years ago, many of the original facts and assumptions that drove the Service's pursuit of Force Design objectives have evolved. Of these changes, one directly impacting the efficacy of the Marine Corps Reserve is its characterization as a "surge" force, with the accompanying perception of excess capacity. Following three years of deliberate Force Design planning, it has become clear that Reserve capacity is more aptly qualified as essential. As a critical element of the Total Force, Reserve Component (RC) capabilities and capacity fully enable the Marine Corps to compete against peer adversaries while fulfilling Service Retained Force (SRF) responsibilities for global crisis and contingency response.

Further, GFM demands Marine Reserve Forces are just as substantial today as they have ever been in the post-9/11 era and are trending upward. A second change noted has been the realization that the Stand-In Force (SIF) concept, initially designed for a USINDOPACOM application, is a global construct. Deployed military formations fulfill SIF roles globally in a campaign of constant competition with our adversaries in support of Integrated Deterrence. In addition, the expanded utilization of Marine Corps Reserve Forces in the USSOUTHCOM AOR greatly enhances Reserve readiness while fulfilling USSOUTHCOM Campaign objectives.

# REVIEW OF STRATEGIC THEMES

The foundational Marine Forces Reserve Campaign Plan 2030 presented three strategic themes to provide an overarching framework of enduring ideological principles guiding our planning efforts. As an unrelenting arbiter, history has once again validated these themes in the context of the MARFORRES mission. The qualifiers Relevant, Ready, and Responsive are just as appropriate today as they were yesterday to characterize the state of the Marine Corps Reserve as a pre-eminent warfighting organization. As the role of the Reserve Force evolves in the context of Force Design vision, MARFORRES will remain a valuable force provider to Combatant Commanders in the pursuit of theater strategies during the full spectrum of competition.





### READY

To be ready implies a posture of administrative and technical preparedness in response to a demand for resources. In the case of the Marine Corps Reserve, readiness begins with the ability to activate and mobilize forces, both individuals and units. Regardless of specialty or skill set, people are the center of gravity for warfighting capability and capacity. As described in the Foreword, the Reserve Force has faced significant challenges to the military Services' ability to recruit, train, and retain this Nation's young warriors. This insolvency directly affects the Nation's ability to contend with its adversaries throughout the competition continuum. Further complicating this dynamic is the rapid technological advancement of warfighting capabilities and the associated requirement to train and retain highly skilled talent, which is in direct competition for recruitment with civilian industry and markets. Moving forward, we must invest in supporting future recruiting efforts as a Total Force. Our readiness depends wholly on recruiting and retaining our institution's most important assets: people.

# **RELEVANT**

Relevance must be sustained through the agile evolution of capabilities on pace with a contemporary and dynamic warfighting problem set. The simple application of additional financial or manpower resources in the short term will not hasten the production of desired results for obsolete organizations or capabilities. If the Marine Corps Reserve is to remain relevant to the Joint Force, it must overcome all forms of hardened bureaucratic resistance to progress that becomes naturally endemic over time within any large organization. The complementary steps MARFORRES has recently taken, such as the establishment of the MIU, highlight a dogged determination not to be left behind in preparation for future global competition and conflict. Further, the ongoing development of a new littoral maneuver capability is another example of how MARFORRES serves a key role through participation in the Service effort to explore universally acknowledged capability requirements. In addition, Service divestment of legacy capabilities and structure, such as armor and bridging, continues to be necessary to realign precious resources for operational relevance in areas such as SIGINT/EW, Cyber, Space, and Precision Fires. Lastly, continued partnership with II MEF, as our active component counterpart within the Service Retained Force (SRF), will help the Marine Corps identify and validate Total Force capability and capacity requirements to meet the warfighting demands of global contingency response forces outside of the USINDOPACOM AOR. Of the three strategic themes presented, relevance remains the most important characteristic for the Reserve Force in the context of warfighting employability. Relevance demands a focused effort of intellectual and professional rigor. An irrelevant force is an unusable force.



## RESPONSIVE

To be responsive means to be agile, scalable, and tailorable to meet the tactical warfighting requirements of Gaining Force Commanders in support of both contingencies and crisis response across the broad spectrum of the competition continuum. In partnership with II MEF as Service-retained forces, MARFORRES will continue to complement II MEF capabilities and capacity, thereby enabling the Marine Corps Reserve to be the force of choice for providing augmentation for contingency response to global threats outside of USINDOPACOM. For example, in September 2021, Combat Logistics Battalion 451 and 23d Marine Regiment were tasked to mobilize within 30 days in support of Task Force Quantico and Task Force Pickett as part of Operation Allies Welcome, designed to support more than 60,000 civilian refugees fleeing from Afghanistan. This rapid employment of Reserve Marines for a humanitarian assistance mission involved hasty joint and inter-agency planning and execution between the Marine Corps, U.S. Army, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and various National Guard entities. The responsiveness remains a vital tenet for the Reserve Force today and in the future, enabling the Total Force to remain postured for other higher-priority tasks.



## IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES

To describe the output of our implementation efforts, which serve to coalesce the previously stated Campaign Plan 2030 Lines of Operation (LOOs), Lines of Effort (LOEs), and Key Objectives (KOs) into meaningful results, we have borrowed a term from Joint language: "mission threads." The below graphic illustrates this concept, as the mission thread (depicted in red) links various KOs/LOEs across the LOOs to achieve a particular Service-level demand in the context of Force Design. The thread below highlights the activities/relationships for establishing the new RC Littoral Craft Companies (LCC), as described in the following narrative.

# Campaign Plan Organizational Architecture FY23 Version 1.0

#### Lines of Effort Infrastructure Utilization/ Capabilities & **Talent Mgmt** (Siting) **Employment** Capacity **Key Objectives** Training & Readiness Modernization Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) ID and Inventory Mgmt GFM/DFE USN/USNR Integration/Partnerships Force Planning ISO Force Design Competition Naval Global Health Scty Coopy Role II Med Capability Talent Management and Career Model Optimization (Naval) Site Optimization / Siting Master Plan Experimentation and Wargaming Support New Platforms & Technologies Integration Lines Of Operation MARFORSOUTH/MARSOC Integration Network Infrastructure (MCEN/SIPR) Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) OPLANS/CONPLANS Recruiting & Retention Conflict MCW& Partnership Studies & Analysis Innovation Unit **Innovation**





### LITTORAL CRAFT COMPANY (LCC) CREATION - CONTINUED



The LCC initiative emerged in response to a 2020 Service-level decision directing the divestment of C (Galveston, Texas) and D (Tampa, Florida.) Companies, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion (AA Bn) in Fiscal Year (FY) 25 and FY24, respectively, in the context of the planned transition to the replacement Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) in the coming years. Preserving vital individual talent, critical future capacity, and premier facilities at these two coastal sites were identified as a high priority. Recruiting and retention at Tampa and Galveston are consistently well above average compared to the rest of the Force at a time when meeting end-strength requirements has proven challenging and contributes significantly to informing MCWL and the adjacent Capability Development Directorate (CDD) of the long-term Total Force capability/capacity solution for littoral maneuver.



Lastly, deliberate planning efforts have expanded for LCC participation during future bilateral and multilateral exercises and enhanced partnering opportunities within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Further, options for MARSOC integration are also being explored, particularly concerning the "Surveillance & Reconnaissance" and "Kinetic & Non-Kinetic Fires and Effects" focus areas from the MCWL Littoral Maneuver Experimentation Plan. This latter effort further illustrates how the mission thread integration concept links these supporting elements together cohesively with potential wide-ranging operational benefits for the Total Force Marine Corps.



### FORCE-LEVEL TRAINING EXERCISES

As the Marine Corps focuses on optimizing capabilities to better posture for a fight in the littorals, we are placing a higher emphasis on Force-level exercises to hone our warfighting skills and integrate new Technologies & Platforms while also helping to inform our evolving maritime doctrine. This focused effort born from FD2030 enhances the relationship between MARFORRES and our partners in the Joint Force and enriches our vital relationships with partner nations on behalf of the Service. Developing and integrating new technologies and optimizing our force laydown while expanding the presence of sister Services and partner nations into our MARFORRES-led exercises ensures the Marine Corps Total Force remains relevant, ready, and responsive for employment in the gray zone of the competition continuum.

To demonstrate this effort, Gunslinger 22, a Joint exercise led by the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, included elements of Marine, Air Force, Army, and National Guard entities and demonstrated the integration of multiple Service-level platforms, technologies, sites, and wargaming support systems against a peer adversary scenario. Nested within the overarching Marine Corps Annual Training Plan, Gunslinger 22 provided an opportunity to deploy and operate in near-real-world conditions, relying on organic and simulated host-nation support to provide sustained operations away from continental United States (CONUS) Home Training Center support. The lessons and relationships built inform future training evolutions and create opportunities for further Joint integration. Lastly, Force-Level exercises such as Gunslinger provide optimal venues to test concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in support of Service priorities while allowing Marines to experience the interdependencies inherent to large-scale operations. Complementary to Gunslinger, the 4th Marine Division's role in planning for and executing Integrated Training Exercise (ITX)-22 also showcased Total Force integration and command and control (C2), aimed to demonstrate combined arms and multi-domain operations against a peer threat.

Overseas multi-lateral exercises, such as Exercises Intrepid Maven and UNITAS, highlight a global commitment to our partners without the structural requirements and overhead associated with a permanent presence abroad. These events play a vital role in demonstrating the integration of our stated LOOs, LOEs, and KOs in pursuing Servicelevel goals and objectives described by the Force Design 2030 vision.





## ENHANCING PARTNERSHIPS IN THE **USSOUTHCOM AOR**

Colocating MARFORSOUTH with MARFORRES in New Orleans began in mid-2021. Since then, these conjoined three-star commands and staff elements generated planning synergy and operational integration while meeting Title 10 requirements. Our asymmetric advantage over adversaries embodies global access, longstanding relationships, and partnering at scale. In FY22, Reserve Forces accounted for 84 percent of the personnel deployed in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, compared to only 10 percent in FY21. Leveraging Reserve Marine talent increased our ability to effectively compete and impose costs on adversaries in USSOUTHCOM's AOR. We accomplished this by selectively activating and deploying MARFORRES assets to execute Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, Joint multinational exercises, and targeted community relations activities supporting USSOUTHCOM campaign objectives.

Maintaining access across USSOUTHCOM's AOR is critical to securing key maritime terrain and sea lines of communication; it also aligns with Integrated Deterrence priorities and directly supports global competition against primary adversaries. By executing MARFORSOUTH's Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs), we enhance partner nation capabilities to secure their territorial waters and Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs). We also foster multilateral interoperability, trust, and information exchange. In FY22, MARFORRES conducted multiple partnering events with six different countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.





These events included but are not limited to: Mobile Training Teams focused on riverine training, noncommissioned officer development, and amphibious command and control; staff-to-staff planning engagements; and major tactical bilateral/multilateral exercises. We developed and conducted these engagements in concert with partner nations, physically demonstrating the power of collaboration, systematic long-term planning, and the resultant growth in regional security capabilities.

### **ENHANCING PARTNERSHIPS - CONTINUED**

Large-scale, Joint multinational exercises in challenging maritime environments provide a cornerstone to our ongoing and future engagement actions. Exercise UNITAS provides a superb example. This long-standing, annual multilateral exercise is MARFORSOUTH's premier OAI and a natural galvanizer for MARFORRES command, staff, and operational elements. It also enables us to think and work with U.S. Navy South, other USSOUTHCOM components, U.S. Interagency assets, and multiple partner nations while generating combat readiness and interoperability. UNITAS 22 brought together naval forces from 19 nations, integrating expertise from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia under a multinational maritime task force.




Hosted by and conducted in Brazil, UNITAS 22 involved a complex, event-driven scenario across multiple domains. The 25th Marine Regiment's command element provided the cornerstone for Marine Corps operations and cross-cultural interactions while planning, rehearsing, executing, and assessing multifaceted collective training. Through such exercises, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and other partner nations take increasingly active roles in regional security endeavors. They also build invaluable relationships with "shipmates" in USSOUTHCOM's AOR and across the globe. While doing so, participants collectively embody and harness the nature of Integrated Deterrence.



### WAY FORWARD

The following visualization of this Campaign Plan's operational design will ensure a seamless transition for future senior leaders. The stated LOOs, LOEs, and KOs remain valid today and will continue to assist subordinate commanders and their staffs to channel and prioritize work in support of Force Design as it matures and evolves in the coming years. To that end, the following three fundamental elements form the basis of this future trajectory of the Marine Corps Reserve: (1) identifying, developing, and retaining talent; (2) building readiness and capacity; and (3) competing, deterring, and understanding our environment. The following diagram illustrates the simple relationship between the three elements, with the convergence in the center suggesting the "ideal."



### IDENTIFY, DEVELOP, AND RETAIN TALENT


Building upon the many successes of enterprise-wide personnel programs such as Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion (DEI), Talent Management 2030, and the Direct Affiliation Program (DAP), MARFORRES has endeavored to honor the "irrational call to service" displayed by our Marines. In essence, we are simply searching for the best our Nation has to offer, regardless of background or military occupational specialty (MOS). Through extraordinary efforts to know the recruitable population and, more importantly, to understand them, certain hard truths related to recruiting and retention have been revealed. Marines want to be challenged, both physically and intellectually. Marines want their contribution to be applied to meaningful endeavors. Marines want to be a part of something larger than themselves.

To retain the best talent in our Total Force, it is necessary to win future battles. The Marine Corps must create a permeable AC/RC retention model, balance personal and professional needs while facilitating dual-career paths, each with enhanced professional development opportunities and provide meaningful challenges that compel personal evolution.



### **BUILDING READINESS AND CAPACITY**

As described earlier in the Ready strategic theme, the true heart of readiness lies with the individual Marine. Building readiness in a warfighting construct is much more than the simple achievement of necessary administrative requirements and technical proficiencies. This is also harnessing the ideological aspects of the desire to serve and, more importantly, to fight our Nation's battles. Any endeavor to create a heightened state of readiness must not interfere with this inherent appetite and drive to be a part of something meaningful in defense of this Nation. Challenging and relevant training opportunities, which include essential "sets and reps" in core warfighting Mission Essential Tasks (METs), enabled by the shrewd attainment and application of resources, will render sustainable combat readiness. Our vast geographic dispersion throughout the United States and associated access to non-USMC maneuver areas and live-fire ranges will expand our opportunities to train in a wide array of challenging climes from extreme cold weather training in Alaska to coastal/riverine training in Mississippi. We are limited only by our imagination, and our young Marines depend on us to provide this exciting and meaningful training.



### COMPETE, DETER, AND UNDERSTAND

As the base movement within the USSOUTHCOM AOR, RC forces training and operating with partner nation personnel will learn and understand the strategic nature of this critical theater. This enables our Marines to directly contribute to global competition and Integrated Deterrence efforts supporting Theater Campaign Plans. As evidenced earlier, the increased GFM demand for RC forces (not just in USSOUTHCOM) creates the opportunity to expose more Marines to global security's ever-changing, complex dynamic. This also indirectly contributes to the more considerable global effort of holding adversaries at risk while imposing costs on their actions (and inactions).

In summary, the investments made to cultivate critical talent and build warfighting readiness produces a Reserve Force capable of global campaigning across the competition continuum while setting the conditions for achieving victory should deterrence fail. There can be no other acceptable outcome, which will take a mature and proficient Total Force to accomplish.

"Only the dead have seen the end of war"

- Plato

# Appendix 1

### **Review of Organizational Architecture**

The LOO and LOE organizational framework introduced in the original Campaign Plan 2030 has proven sufficient to guide efforts in pursuing KOs within the prescribed timelines. Detailed narratives will be offered in the coming pages to further describe achievements and to characterize what we've learned since executing the plan. While the LOOs and LOEs have been validated, several KOs have been subsequently modified based upon a clearer understanding of governing facts and assumptions. These adjustments will be articulated as required in each of the LOE summary reports. The below chart reflects the updated framework moving forward.

## Campaign Plan Organizational Architecture

#### Lines of Effort Utilization/ Capabilities & Infrastructure **Talent Mgmt Employment** Capacity (Siting) Key Objectives Training & Readiness Modernization Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) ID and Inventory Mgmt GFM/DFE USN/USNR Integration/Partnerships Force Planning ISO Force Design Competition Naval Global Health Scty Coop / Role II Med Capability RC Talent Management and Career Model Optimization (Naval) Site Optimization / Siting Master Plan Experimentation and Wargaming Support New Platforms & Technologies Integration **Lines Of Operation** Network Infrastructure (MCEN/SIPR) MARFORSOUTH/MARSOC Integration Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) OPLANs/CONPLANS Recruiting & Retention Conflict MCWL Partnership Studies & Analysis Innovation Unit **Innovation**

# Appendix 2

### **Validation of our Lines of Operation:**

As mentioned previously, the defined Conflict, Competition, and Innovation LOOs have proven effective in our planning efforts and will continue to serve as trajectories for grounding our integration pursuits. Each LOO will be briefly summarized below, to include offering insight into what we've learned through execution of our KO goals and milestones in consideration of contemporary world events.

### **Line of Operation: CONFLICT**

The primary challenge the Marine Corps is facing relative to the pacing threat (i.e., China) continues to be the adversary's accelerated modernization and "intelligentisation" — the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy into their C2, weapon systems and platforms, and decision-making architecture. The pace of this accelerated AI technological advancement is driving exponential gains in multi-domain platforms and associated capabilities. These rapid gains directly affect the permeability of competing kill chains, thereby incurring risk for the less nimble competitor. In other words, we must be able to out-cycle our adversaries if we are to maintain (or seek) any type of competitive advantage.

The requirement for significant modernization and redesign in order to develop a maritime "stand-in force" (SIF) with capabilities to operate across multiple domains and the spectrum of competition, to include conflict, remains a crucial high priority. Over the last year, we have learned two important points: one, the SIF concept must be executed globally, and in concert with any Joint crisis response; and secondly, should competition devolve into armed conflict, the associated Operational Plan/Contingency Plan (OPLAN/CONPLAN) will likely trigger related plans within other regions of the world. Such events will require not just armed forces for conflict, but a coordinated "whole-of-government" approach to support continued competition and/or crisis response. To that end, the Marine Corps does not have the luxury, nor sole responsibility, of singularly focusing on a specific threat in a specific theater, to the exclusion of all other global threats.



# **Appendix 2 - CONTINUED**

As noted from recent conflicts such as the Syrian civil war and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the maxim that all regional conflicts have global implications has proven itself valid. Modern regional conflicts have consistently involved Great Powers, both directly and indirectly, by virtue of today's inherent interconnectedness of the global ecosystem. However, while not all conflicts require or demand a military response, the unpredictability of how these conflicts evolve require a continuous evolution of warfighting capabilities to effectively respond should the military option be required.

Lastly, the modern security environment is characterized by the proliferation of sophisticated commercially available dual-use sensors, precision weapons, and technologies that are exploited by both allies and adversaries alike. This fact directly impacts strategic competition and gray-zone conflict. As an integral part of the SRF responding to crisis or contingencies globally, MARFORRES forces must be prepared to operate within a multidomain environment.

Specifically, actions in the information domain such as electromagnetic spectrum management (i.e., battlespace awareness, cyberspace, space, and influence operations) must remain key priorities for the Total Force.



### **Line of Operation: COMPETITION**

In studying recent conflicts such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020), the Russian annexation of Crimea (2014), and the invasion of Ukraine (2022), we must consider the transition from competition to open conflict is characterized by an ambiguous gray zone of paramilitary operations, a fight for the information space, dominance of space, and manned/unmanned teaming. Many conflicts in the last decade have also been characterized by a blending of social movements, social revolution, and unconventional military operations, with peer and near-peer adversaries acting as catalysts.



The 2022 NDS recognizes that for a comprehensive national strategy to deter conflict in an era of Great Power Competition, it must include strategic approaches for Integrated Deterrence and a campaigning approach to competition. Consequently, the Marine Corps Total Force has been and will continue to be an integral part of countering gray-zone actions of our adversaries globally, as planned through the GFM process. To that end, the alignment of respective MARFORRES and MARFORSOUTH tasks and functions has enabled increased support to USSOUTHCOM campaign objectives while also optimizing RC readiness. This model has also facilitated practice and experimentation against real-world problems to advance our Service concepts and contribute to both gray-zone activities and competition.

Further, in the context of competing, our asymmetric advantage over adversaries is the ability to integrate with partner nations, the Joint Force, and the Interagency across all domains. Examples of missions suitable for Marine Corps Total Force integration include countering Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported Fishing (IUUF) and Trans-National Criminal Activity (TCA) within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. These maligned activities are often leveraged by our adversaries to cause coercion, corruption, and destabilization of partners in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, while also threatening the southern approaches to the United States. Support to the Interagency in these missions provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to contribute to advances in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) while supporting a whole-of-government approach to countering our adversaries' efforts. This effective partnership blends Marine Corps capabilities with naval operational reach, ensuring MDA in the vicinity of critical strategic maritime terrain while also increasing interoperability and information sharing with partner nations and adjacent GCCs.

### **Line of Operation: INNOVATION**

Innovation is not a new concept. It refers to the process of determining the precise problem to be solved, figuring out a better way to solve the problem, and building a coalition to experiment, implement, and sustain the solution rapidly. What is new, however, is the current pace of technological advancement around the world. These advancements have created waves of dual-use commercial technologies that threaten our military advantage in many warfighting areas. These capabilities are rapidly being developed and harnessed by our adversaries, both state- and non-state actors alike, which introduces significant risk and vulnerability to our national security framework. We have realized at the heart of innovation are innovators



— people — Marines. And in many cases, young, inspired, creative Marines with an abundance of curiosity and imagination are in search of a path to focus and channel these drives. The innovation concepts described in the MARFORRES Campaign Plan 2030, coupled with these innovators, form the foundation for the new MIU. Through an unconventional approach, the MIU seeks to identify and exploit the intellect and networks of uniquely talented Reserve Marines to solve today's most pressing problems faster, leveraging alternative sources of funding.



MIU was activated in March 2022 at Stewart Air National Guard Base, N.Y., as a key driver of the Campaign Plan's Innovation LOO. Leveraging industry recruiting practices and tools, MIU queried more than 100,000 Reserve Marines to identify unique academic and civilian skill sets, yielding about 130 Reserve Marines that have joined the unit and are solving critical Force Design, Talent Management, and Training and Education challenges. Through MIU, we implemented new pathways to cultivate high-potential Reserve Marines to serve from all ranks, MOSs, and status.

The Corps' ability to institute Force Design is largely dependent upon effectively leveraging our Defense Industrial Base. MIU's Commercial Engagement Branch, based on their unique position as Marines and commercial leaders, provided an opportunity to work with the Defense Industrial Base, whether small craft, software-as-a-service, or through a partner agency like the DIU to make relevant and timely solutions available to the Total Force.

Lastly, MIU's partnership with the MCWL was codified by activating seven Science and Technology Liaison Officers who are assigned to U.S. Government and

Department of Defense organizations to build durable partnerships for capability development. Working with the MEFs and Deputy Commandants, MIU conducted 23 separate engagements across data, cyber, experimentation, information, unmanned aerial systems, and wargaming that complement the Competition and Conflict LOOs.

These efforts will continue to generate huge dividends for the Service. As concepts mature and we collectively harness the intellect, diverse talent, and professional drive that resides within the Reserve Force, we will bring critical capabilities online faster than our adversaries.

# Appendix 3

#### Validation of our Lines Of Effort:

Similar to the Lines of Operation, our stated LOEs have proven a valuable framework from which to organize and coordinate the achievement of KOs. The following pages will summarize each of the four LOEs to include highlighting KO achievements and lessons learned.

#### **Line of Effort: Infrastructure**

The Infrastructure LOE remains valid and provides enabling capabilities for the other lines of effort. At the heart of our infrastructure resides the vital physical Reserve Training Center (RTC) laydown, providing the foundation for individual/unit readiness and mobilization. Much like traditional bases and stations, RTCs must be functional, safe, secure, and resilient. They must also be proximate to demographically supportable Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) populations and required training areas while postured to execute other assigned Service-level tasks, including military funeral honors, casualty assistance, and support to the Marine Corps Reserve Toys for Tots program. As the Marine Corps undergoes generational change, MARFORRES must refine and implement its long-term siting plans to meet readiness, training, recruiting, and future Force capability requirements.

In concert with the Service and other installation hosting organizations, MARFORRES will optimize the utilization of existing facilities and available resources while eliminating cost-prohibitive, suboptimal, and excess sites. MARFORRES will actively pursue cost-sharing Joint solutions where applicable. In addition to the comprehensive need for this coordination, it is even more vital to remain engaged with Congress, articulating the infrastructure requirements for the Marine Corps Reserve in the context of the Service's Force Design efforts. Full transparency and deliberate meetings with select members of Congress will garner their support and increase the chances of securing resources to enable or accelerate modernization.



#### Infrastructure Line of Effort - CONTINUED

Another critical element within the Infrastructure LOE is network modernization. MARFORRES continues to prioritize, engage, and enhance information exchange capabilities across the vast RTC architecture distributed throughout the United States. Recently, MARFORRES transitioned significant network responsibilities and corresponding structure to Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG). For FY23 and beyond, work and coordination continue along several previously established KOs along the Infrastructure LOE to provide the Reserve Force with increased connectivity and bandwidth. This is a priority as the Marine Corps continues to employ ever more data-intensive communication tools in support of emerging capabilities. As the information age places additional demands on Reserve infrastructure, MARFORRES will remain engaged with the Service to identify, and program required resources, leveraging Congressional interest where available.

Regarding Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)/Special Access Programs (SAP)/Special Technical Operations (STO)/Controlled Access Program (CAP) infrastructure, the Marine Corps lacks facilities, security personnel, and information technology to integrate future SCI/SAP/STO/CAP capabilities through the requirement development process. Consequently, the Service established an Integrated Planning Team to address these requirements vital to ensuring the successful implementation of Force Design goals. As MARFORRES evolves under Force Design and fields advanced capabilities, access to required SCI Facilities (SCIF) and SAP Facilities (SAPF) must be planned for. Consequently, MARFORRES/MARFORSOUTH requirements are included in the broader Marine Corps infrastructure planning initiative and will continue to be validated as Force Design decisions are rendered.











### **Line of Effort: Talent Management**

In Talent Management 2030, the Commandant committed to redesigning the Marine Corps' personnel system to recruit, develop, and retain a corps of Marines that is more intelligent, physically fit, cognitively mature, and experienced. This end state cannot be fully realized without the proper identification, management, development, and retention of talent and the corresponding investment in our individual Marines.

To achieve Force Design goals, the Marine Corps is leveraging the Marine Corps Reserve to attract and retain diverse personnel with unique talent and skillsets while also providing fulfilling military career paths compatible with concurrent civilian careers. Initiatives such as DAP provides unique opportunities for Marines with valuable skills departing the AC to continue their service in the Reserve Force. This program increases Reserve unit personnel readiness while retaining fully trained and talented Marines in the Total Force.

It is our goal to develop an atmosphere in which high-potential Marines, regardless of MOS, are challenged through meaningful training opportunities to succeed and contribute to the warfighting readiness and capabilities of the future Force. Recent increases in planned training events in the USSOUTHCOM AO have resulted in exciting and fulfilling opportunities to engage with partner nations in a deployed environment in pursuit of real-world competition with adversaries.



### Talent Management Highlights of KO Accomplishments and Lessons Learned:

Reserve Component Talent Management and Career Model Optimization. Aligned with the Service's newly formed Talent Management Strategy Group, MARFORRES introduced several new initiatives to increase career flexibility while further developing talent in the Reserve Force. Both AC and RC officers are now allowed to opt out of promotion consideration in a given year without a career penalty. Also, a parental leave program was established authorizing Reserve Marines in a drilling status to defer active duty or inactive duty for training (IDT) for up to 84 days as well as granting up to 12 periods of paid IDT following a birth or adoption event.

Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) Identification and Inventory Management. The MIU implemented a COTS software solution for recruiting that also identified individual Marine KSAs, filling a significant knowledge gap in legacy manpower management systems. This has the potential for a broader application across the Total Force for the identification, screening, and cataloging of individual Marines with high-value skill sets to satisfy unique personnel requirements.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. MARFORRES has focused its DEI efforts on the sole purpose of making us better warfighters so that we win future battles. To that end, we implemented the Diversity AIMED (Attract, Identify, Mentor, Educate and Develop) Officer Program, which engages historically underrepresented populations and provides Marines with opportunities to visualize and pursue career paths as Marine Corps officers through educational events, hands-on experiences, and senior leader mentorship. The selection process for the most recent event was highly competitive due to the superior quality of applicants, which is a direct reflection of the leadership involvement in identifying and encouraging talented Marines to apply. In the end, the Marine Corps simply wants to acquire and develop the best possible leaders, regardless of background, so that all future battles will be won. Correctly framing emerging problems leads to bold decisions made at the speed of relevance. This should be our primary advantage against current and future adversaries.





### Line of Effort: Capabilities and Capacity

MARFORRES continues to focus on evolving RC capabilities in line with Force Design 2030 initiatives using II MEF as the "pacing force" within the SRF construct for global crisis/contingency response. Additionally, the geographic proximity of the USSOUTHCOM AOR to continental United States-based MARFORRES units provides a unique opportunity for expanded training and exercise employment of RC capabilities in support of realworld Combatant Command requirements.

MARFORRES is also committed to an enduring partnership with MARSOC, focused on sourcing low-density and/or RC-unique Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and SMCR expertise in support of MARSOC Training Effectiveness Evaluation Plan requirements through the application of a purpose-built GFM model. Further, ongoing senior leader and staff engagements are cultivating effective partnerships with MCWL and Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) focused on ensuring Navy Reserve capabilities are more fully understood and leveraged across the Department in support of Force Design 2030, Fleet Battle Problem experimentation, and the Service-level Campaign of Learning.

As Force Design 2030 continues to evolve, MARFORRES will engage with Deputy Commandant Combat Development & Integration (DC CD&I) leadership and planners to collaboratively identify and validate requirements, conduct a thorough analysis, and determine viable RC Force development options. These efforts include a detailed examination of RC material requirements in Total Force Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) calculations and an improved understanding of where concurrent fielding of new platforms and technology across the AC/RC offers the maximum potential to retain talent, mature the Force, and ultimately buy down long-term Service-level risk.

### Capabilities and Capacity Highlights of KO Accomplishments and Lessons Learned:

Force Planning. MARFORRES capability planning requires sustained and forward-looking engagement with DC CD&I leadership to effectively advocate for RC requirements. MARFORRES planners must continue to deliberately identify, synthesize, and action formally and informally defined requirements as well as inferred Service requirements to more effectively present analysis and options to the Service on how to build a more ready, relevant, and responsive RC.



New Platforms and Technology Integration. Capability development associated with emerging Force Design concepts such as littoral maneuver has proven challenging due to misaligned unity of effort amongst stakeholders. MARFORRES' pursuit of formally undefined yet universally accepted Service-level requirements has proven difficult in the face of institutional barriers despite low-cost/high-return opportunities. Inclusion of RC requirements in Total Force platform AAO calculations requires consistent advocacy and must be complemented by continual close monitoring of associated fielding plans and the new Service Equipping Strategy implementation in order to accurately account for RC equity and considerations.

MCWL Partnership. The newly established MCWL/MARFORRES/MARFORSOUTH and NAVSO/C4F Experimentation Working Group have conducted a series of synchronization meetings to baseline a more unified approach to experimentation "by-with-and through" Marine and Navy stakeholders. Further maturation of this partnership requires consistent senior leader engagement both within MARFORRES and externally with DC CD&I. Early integrated Joint Exercise Life Cycle (JELC) planning is required to align and nest MCWL experiments and LOE priorities within MARFORRES and MARFORSOUTH events and exercises.

USN/USNR Capability Integration and Partnerships. MARFORRES conducted annual Navy Reserve/Marine Corps Reserve staff talks aimed at identifying opportunities to exercise/experiment in support of contested logistics by employing a broad set of Navy Reserve capabilities/capacity (CNRFC, MARFORRES, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command [NECC]-Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group/Maritime Expeditionary Security Force). This effort leveraged collaboration opportunities across multiple areas to include talent management and retention, information system solutions, activation processes, and the innovation community of interest. Maturation of this partnership also requires senior leader engagement both within MARFORRES and externally with CNRFC and NECC.

Studies and Analysis. MARFORRES must continue to aggressively leverage the Marine Corps Call for Studies Program as well as the newly formed Marine Corps University and Naval Post-Graduate School Research and Study partnerships to develop scholarly research projects in support of RC problem sets. Well-scoped projects can answer Force Design 2030-generated learning demands related to creating "a more fully integrated force" by generating the objective analysis required to advance future-looking Total Force concepts and approaches.

Marine Innovation Unit. MIU achieved its prescribed Initial Operational Capability on schedule, including the training and placement of full-time liaison officers in direct support of MCWL objectives. The MIU focus areas were refined to further inform improvements to the MIU/MCWL command relationship to ensure unity of effort and alignment. Significant senior-level engagement and advocacy are once again required to gain Service-level buy-in on the MIU value proposition as a Force Design 2030 accelerator.

Training and Readiness Model Modernization. Continuing actions are underway to develop and gain approval for a Reserve Activation Marine Corps Task (MCT), Mission Essential Task (MET), and assigned METL in order to support the achievement of realistic and measurable RC unit mobilization readiness. Other initiatives include the implementation of a new Corporals Course curriculum and RC-specific delivery method in response to the publication of updated PME requirements by the Service. Substantial progress has also been made in capturing drill and annual training participation rates and costing through the ongoing development of the MARFORRES Drill and Annual Training Tracker (MDATT). This multi-department effort will result in effective and proactive forecasting for in-year execution and will inform out-year Program Objective Memorandums (POMs), thereby ensuring sufficient funding to meet Reserve training requirements.



### Line of Effort: Utilization and Employment

The Marine Corps continues to use Reserve Forces to fulfill the Service's responsibilities as a Force provider to the combatant commanders while transitioning AC Forces to meet Force Design 2030 mandates. Since 2020, MARFORRES planners have worked with Service and geographical MARFOR planners to activate and employ more than 4,000 Marines supporting some 60 GFM requirements in support of all six GCCs. MARFORRES will continue its role in aiding the Service in maintaining a global presence while providing Unit Deployment Forces to the Marine Corps' priority theater, USINDOPACOM, through 2029, thus enabling AC modernization.

MARFORRES has taken advantage of being co-located with the MARFORSOUTH staff by leveraging this unique relationship to provide deployment and engagement opportunities for Reserve Marines while simultaneously demonstrating the ability to compete with our adversaries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. While there have been minimal activation requirements, MARFORRES has provided subject matter experts to train partner-nation forces, small units for Theater Security Cooperation exercises, as well as participation in Joint exercises, to include those of a naval character. In addition to active participation in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, MARFORRES maintains a global presence through exercise participation in every GCC AOR. These deployments will continue to provide units with the opportunity to rehearse mobilization tasks as they deploy for outside the continental United States annual-training events. As such, they combine operational Reserve requirements with preparation for strategic activation and employment.





### **Utilization and Employment Highlights of KO Accomplishments and Lessons Learned:**

Global Force Management. While our Reserve Marines are willing to volunteer for some short-notice deployments (e.g., HIMARS for the 24th MEU), sustaining the readiness of the Force requires proactive and deliberate planning. Force planners continually need to educate Force employers on the requirements for notification of Reserve Marines and Sailors, and the Service has to make timely decisions to support Reserve Force timelines. Rotating Reserve units through GCC AORs as SIF is best exercised by the deliberate GFM process.

OPLANS/CONPLANS. Limited planning fidelity exists regarding OPLANS/CONPLANS as most GCCs are in the process of rewriting plans. MARFORRES planners will need to continue to communicate with their geographical MARFOR counterparts to ensure Reserve capabilities/capacities and requirements are appropriately captured in the revisions of existing plans. GCCs must have realistic requirements for Marine Corps Total Force offerings and not expect capacity that either does not exist or is already committed.

MARSOC Integration. MARFORRES continued to provide MARSOC with training support as well as augmentation of Reserve-unique (not in MARSOC) capabilities for employment across the globe. Specific support to DERNA BRIDGE and RAVEN training exercises will continue for the foreseeable future, as will civil affairs and intelligence support to deploying forces. The future will require an enhanced model where top talent with common high-density/low-demand skillsets (e.g., Critical Skills Operators, Special Operations Officers, Civil Affairs, Counter-Intel/Human Intel, etc.) can be developed and retained via this partnership.

MARFORSOUTH. MARFORRES supported UNITAS in 2021 and 2022 and will be supporting UNITAS-23. Early integrated planning facilitates the employment of Reserve Forces during the exercise. Opportunities are numerous but must be coordinated early for MARFORRES to support with Reserve personnel and funding. Training in the USSOUTHCOM AOR provides unique experiences for the Reserve Marines, and there are significant indications this opportunity helps with retention.

