



# Relevant

# Ready



# Responsive



#### **Foreword**



My top priority is training Marines and Sailors for success in combat. The purpose of our training is to ensure the Marines of the Red Diamond are physically rugged, mentally hardened, and proficient in the skills required to accomplish the mission.

I see training as a key element in the MARFORRRES themes of remaining relevant, ready, and responsive. Relevant, because a well-trained Reserve force provides the Service additional capacity and capabilities that enable our rapid augmentation of the Active Component. Ready, because training enables units to activate with the skills necessary to rapidly progress once at Intermediate location (ILOC) training. Responsive, because once activated, well trained units are agile, so can quickly increase their proficiency to meet assigned training requirements. All training will be performance-related, evaluated, and include inspections. Leaders will ensure the execution of training plans are supervised, rehearsals are conducted, and confirmation briefs are completed prior to training execution. After-Action Reviews (AARs), led by the leader, and debriefs led by an evaluator, will be conducted after all training events. Marines will be trained, individually assessed, and certified as proficient in common combat skills, their military occupational specialty, and the employment of assigned weapons. To maximize the use of the limited time available, all deploying Marines will prepare for combat environments through a combination of distance learning and unit training.

Additionally, Red Diamond units require great leadership, and I see character as one of the most important traits a leader can have. As Marines, we are all leaders. Making ethical and moral decisions define our character and enable the trust that is necessary to lead. No matter how proficient a leader is, if their character is flawed, trust is lost, and the units they lead will not be ready for combat. There is a reason our motto is Semper Fidelis, and I expect all members of 4MARDIV to live up to this standard. As the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps stated, "...character and culture associated with being known as the finest fighting force must prevail above all else. The character of those that are leaders must be beyond reproach. Thus, the Marine Corps will continue to be associated with having the highest honor, most remarkable courage, and uncompromising commitment."

My desired end state is an offensively minded Division, trained to enter ILOC, skilled in the disciplined application of force, and possessing the sturdy moral courage to win a fight against an enemy on a littoral battlefield.

Douglas K. Clark Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General, 4th Marine Division

### **Purpose**



The 2023-2025 4th Marine Division (4MARDIV) Campaign Plan is the capstone document for the command's activities during this timeframe. This Campaign Plan aims to provide a roadmap, nested within and aligned with Strategic Guidance, Force Design, and the MARFORRES Campaign Plan. It simultaneously communicates the command's level of commitment, direction, and guidance to all members of the Division. This campaign plan advances along four lines of effort (LOE): training readiness for ILOC, basic tactical and technical proficiency, retention and recruiting, and information. Additionally, three principles, nested within MARFORRES guidance, dictate the focus of this campaign plan: relevant, ready, and responsive.



## **Table of Contents**

Foreword	
Purpose	
Table of Contents	
Operating Environment	
Implications of Strategic Guidance	
Implications of CMC Guidance	
COMMARFORRES Guidance	
4MARDIV Mission and Commanding General's Guidance	
Campaign Plan Framework: Operational Approach	
4MARDIV Force Laydown	
4MARDIV Organization	12

## **Operating Environment**

The Nation's competitors have improved their combat capabilities over the last decade. They have continued to rapidly develop and field advanced warfighting technology suitable for use at the high end of the competition continuum. As the Commandant has identified, the "unipolar moment" of the Nation has passed and is being replaced by a resurgence of strategic competition with China and Russia. As is evidenced by Russian aggression, and effective Ukrainian resistance, the character of warfare is shifting as well. Technological and social factors drive these changes. As such, the Nation must pivot from the experiences of the last two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan and embrace the future character of conflict.

At the national level, the United States continues to adjust to threats to better advance and safeguard its vital national interests. China, because it poses a threat across all domains, is identified as the most consequential competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD). On the other hand, Russia has demonstrated that it poses an acute threat, albeit one that is not synchronized across all domains. Both countries seek to expand their influence globally, including in the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), as an element of the Service-retained force aligned with II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), will play an essential role in USSOUTH-COM due to its close relationship with Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH). The military-to-military engagements that MARFORSOUTH conducts and MARFORRES sources will build relationships that influence nations to choose the United States as their partner of choice, limiting Chinese and Russian influence. Additionally, while addressing China and Russia, the Nation must remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

The force is also affected by domestic and Service-specific factors. The pool of those eligible to join the military continues to shrink. More young men and women than ever before are disqualified due to obesity, drug use, or criminal records. Only 23% of Americans ages 17-24 are qualified to serve without a waiver. According to a DOD survey, only 13% had parents who served in the military, down from approximately 40% in 1995. Additionally, COVID-19 significantly affected the Service's ability to assess new Marines into the Marine Corps, causing many units to operate below normal personnel strength. These reduced personnel levels necessitate the augmentation of units to meet training and operational requirements, complicating training and activation. The Division is addressing these problems by focusing on improving manning levels so that it remains capable of meeting its requirements. Internal to the Reserve Component in particular, limited time and resources shape the day-to-day operating environment. These factors require all leaders to maximize training time and resources through well-planned, resourced, and executed events. Combined with a command climate where Marines know that the command cares for them, these efforts will significantly enhance a unit's ability to retain, recruit, and professionally develop its Marines.




## **Implications of Strategic Guidance**

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that DOD will counter threats and advance the Nation's goals through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. 4MARDIV has a vital role in these efforts. Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of national power, and the Nation's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. 4MARDIV Marines and Sailors contribute to this effort and have a strategic effect because they are continuously ready to activate, undergo ILOC training, and deploy in a relevant timeframe. This ability is vitally important because it shows the surge capacity that MARFORRES provides to the Active Component, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Force as a whole. This capability helps deter the Nation's adversaries by demonstrating the credible ability to defeat them in combat. The Division's current and future deployments in support of the Unit Deployment Program in the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) AOR offer an example of 4MARDIV contributions to the integrated deterrence of China as it seeks to influence its neighbors.

When the efforts mentioned above are logically coordinated and sequenced with other governmental actions, 4MARDIV units are participating in a campaign. The Division contributes to this campaign in many ways. Operating as part of a broader MARFORRES effort, the Division aligns its activities with other instruments of national power. These actions allow the Division to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop unit warfighting capabilities. Perhaps the most visible contributions are the engagements that the Division undertakes while overseas training with allies and partners. Even very short and relatively simple interactions help to displace adversary efforts. The interactions inform countries working with 4MARDIV units of the benefits of choosing the United States as their partner of choice. These countries see the professionalism of the Marines and Sailors which then develops trust and confidence between the host nation's government and the United States. These ally and partner engagements have an outsized impact relative to the resources they consume. 4MARDIV annual participation in UNITAS in the USSOUTHCOM AOR is an example of this sort of effort.

Finally, 4MARDIV contributes to building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force by undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, rapidly fielding new technology, and making investments in the Division's extraordinary people. 4MARDIV actions that advance or enhance these efforts include the transition of cannon artillery to eight-gun batteries, the transition of infantry battalions to an Reserve Component Force Design 2030 Infantry Battalion construct, and the experimentation with littoral craft by Division units.



### Implications of CMC Guidance

"The 2018 NDS redirected the Marine Corps' mission focus from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, train, and equip our Corps. A return to our historic role in the maritime littoral will also demand greater integration with the Navy and a reaffirmation of that strategic partnership. As a consequence, we must transform our traditional models for organizing, training, and equipping the force to meet new desired ends, and do so in full partnership with the Navy."

- General David H. Berger, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)

The 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) is a paradigm shift for the Total Force. It places a spotlight on many vital issues. Although consistently recognized as important within the Marine Corps, the CPG reemphasizes the importance of the individual Marine. There is no Marine Corps without the Marine. Due to their placement, 4MARDIV Marines are important ambassadors between the Service and the larger community. Their positive interaction with civilian counterparts helps attract new talent to the Marine Corps. The CPG also recognizes the importance of retaining the most talented Marines. To implement the force design articulated by the Service, talent retention must be a priority. Just as the Division focuses on readiness, it will also focus on talent management efforts, which include retention and recruiting.

MARFORRES and II MEF are the Service-retained combat forces controlled by the Marine Corps. 4MARDIV, as the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of MARFORRES, must be prepared to rapidly augment II MEF and other Active Component forces to execute contact layer activities, contribute to integrated deterrence, engage and train with partners and allies, and rapidly respond to crisis when called upon to do so. 4MARDIV units will seek to train with II MEF units as opportunities arise. Per Commander MARFORRES guidance on exercise priorities, training with II MEF is second only to training opportunities provided by MARFORSOUTH.

Force Design 2030 envisions the Reserve and Active Components of the Marine Corps as a single, integrated Total Force, and not distinct and semi-independent Active and Reserve Components. However, the Service does recognize the limitations of the Reserve Component. The CPG states that while organized and equipped congruently, the Service does not expect Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units to maintain the same levels of readiness as Active Component units. The Service expects SMCR units and Marines to be "ready for mobilization." Once activated, these units will undergo pre-deployment training to achieve the necessary readiness for deployment and employment. To that end, 4MARDIV established pre-ILOC training requirements referred to as Day 1 ILOC requirements. They are specified for each unit type, which defines the level of readiness a 4MARDIV Marine, Sailor, or unit must attain in preparation for activation. Once at ILOC, mission-specific skills will be determined, trained to, and perfected prior to deployment.



#### **COMMARFORRES Guidance**

"Marines are defined not by any capability, organizational structure, or piece of equipment but by "'our collective character as Marines.'" We must never forget that our ethos and culture are paramount to sustaining our future."

#### - MARFORRES Campaign Plan 2030

As part of the single integrated Total Force that CMC envisions, the Marine Corps Reserve remains a vital contributor to the warfighting capability and capacity of the Naval Service. The ongoing modernization effort resulting from the implementation of Force Design 2030 illustrates the commitment of the Marine Corps to sustaining a relevant and capable Reserve Force. The Marine Corps Reserve is focused on integrating with the Active Component across the competition continuum (which includes conflict). It is also focused on providing specialized and general-purpose conventional forces in response to other global contingencies. Further, Marine Forces Reserve is uniquely postured to partner with the Navy's 4th Fleet. This partnership will generate opportunities to develop and employ unique talent and skillsets that will contribute to the USSOUTHCOM campaign and enhance global maritime interoperability with the Nation's partners and allies.

MARFORRES must adhere to three strategic themes: relevant, ready, and responsive. The Reserve Force will remain relevant by maintaining a multi-domain warfighting capability and capacity. This remains an imperative guiding principle in the modernized Reserve Force. In the eyes of the Joint Force, obsolete or unnecessary capabilities and excess capacity is viewed as a drain on finite resources needed to build new capabilities and capacity. For this reason, the Reserve Force will focus on modernizing current capabilities and developing new ones, such as littoral maneuver. The Reserve Force also maintains relevance through its capability to provide additional capacity to the Service in an affordable manner. Many Reserve Component capabilities are in an intentionally degraded state of combat readiness to conserve resources; however, they can be quickly brought up to full readiness during the pre-deployment training process.

As highlighted in the CPG, the Commandant's vision for the future Reserve Force is to be "ready to mobilize" in support of Total Force requirements. This level of readiness requires a high degree of administrative preparedness that enables rapid activation of Marine Reservists individually or as part of a warfighting unit. A ready-to-mobilize unit can quickly activate and process its Marines through its Reserve Training Center and on to ILOC for subsequent pre-deployment training. While training to higher than directed unit Mission Essential Tasks throughout the year is ideal, inherent constraints associated with limited time compete with the demands of Day 1 ILOC readiness. MARFORRES cannot afford to waste time mitigating administrative, logistical, or basic training shortfalls during a unit's limited time conducting ILOC training at the expense of unit combat readiness. Post-activation training time is a commander's most precious commodity before deployment and cannot be spent on tasks that could have been completed prior.

A responsive capability is one that is agile, scalable, and tailorable to meet the Combatant Commander's requirements in a timely manner. As the Service-retained pacing force, II MEF will help to shape requirements that enable MARFORRES to be the force-of-choice when providing augmentation for contingency response to global threats outside of USINDOPACOM. For example, should II MEF be directed to respond to an emerging crisis, MARFORRES must be prepared to source task-organized units within a tactically relevant time frame in order to bring combat capabilities to bear that are required to deter or contain the crisis and, when needed, win battles.

- MARFORRES Campaign Plan 2030



#### **4MARDIV Mission and Commanding General's Guidance**

**4MARDIV Mission:** To provide trained combat and combat support units and personnel to augment and reinforce the Active Component in time of war, national emergency, and at other times as national security requires.

4MARDIV is a team. It is comprised of some of the finest Marines, Sailors, and civilians, both reserve and active, performing their duties as members of combat units, combat support units, and Inspector-Instructor staffs. The Division provides the Service a surge capacity that enables it to meet Combatant Commander requirements by augmenting and reinforcing the Active Component. The Division maintains the ability to accomplish this by staying at the forefront of modernization efforts, conducting aggressive realistic training, and maintaining unit readiness to activate in a timely manner. Or, as articulated by Commander MARFORRES, by being a relevant, ready, and responsive force.

Relevant – 4MARDIV remains relevant through its modernization and innovation efforts and provides the Service with additional capacity. Modernization enables the Division to maintain the right forces for the future fight and ensures it can seamlessly integrate with the Active Component, which also continues to modernize and adapt. Examples include the artillery battery conversion to an eight-gun construct, the Infantry Battalion transition to a Reserve Component Force Design 2030 Infantry Battalion structure, and innovation in littoral maneuver. These initiatives bring 4MARDIV units into line with their Active Component counterparts. The Division also maintains relevance by contributing to the overall combat power of the Service while consuming relatively few resources. The Service conserves these resources by limiting the number of days a reservist serves per year and through the establishment of training allowances. Units intentionally truncate the amount of gear they maintain on-hand to enable effective maintenance within the limited work hours available. Through these efforts, the Division will maintain and improve its relevance to the Service and the Joint Force as a whole.

**Ready** – The Marine Corps has always excelled at being prepared for whatever the Nation requires. 4MARDIV will maintain readiness through standards-based training conducted in conjunction with partner nation exercises, integration with the Active Component, Service Level Training Events (SLTE), and participation in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises such as UNITAS and TRADEWINDS. This readiness includes training, administrative, and logistical readiness that enables units to activate and deploy. To delineate specifically what these readiness standards are, the Division's Training and Readiness Guidance defined the required preactivation training standards and administrative and logistical requirements referred to as Day 1 ILOC requirements. Units currently report readiness against these standards through the Division Headquarters. Still, work is underway to capture these requirements in the Defense Readiness Reporting System to increase visibility at the Service level and above. This information will, in turn, provide Service awareness of all Division units' readiness to activate, thereby informing sourcing decisions to meet requirements.


**Responsive** – The Marine Corps prides itself on its ability to rapidly act when the Nation calls, and to be the "first to fight." 4MARDIV embraces this theme. Regarding the Division, the capability to rapidly respond manifests itself in the ability to quickly activate, augment, and reinforce the Active Component. The Division demonstrates the agility to rapidly provide task organized forces routinely. Recent examples include the activations of a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System platoon in less than 35 days in support of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the activation in less than 30 days to support OPERATION ALLIES WELCOME. In the future, as threat capabilities grow, the speed at which the Nation requires us to respond to threats will also grow, but the Division will be prepared.



# Campaign Plan Framework: Operational Approach

The Division's center of gravity is a well-led force of Marines and Sailors trained and equipped at the unit of employment level. This enables 4MARDIV to activate forces that meet emerging requirements. The Division objectives are to achieve Day 1 ILOC tactical readiness post SLTE; always maintain individual readiness; properly equip units for training and readiness; meet First Term Obligation Plan, Subsequent Term Obligation Plan, and Reserve manning requirements; and synchronize information efforts. In accordance with the Division's Force Management Plan, units will progress through tiered readiness as they reset/rebuild following activation, build readiness, maintain readiness as a ready-bench for force offering, and finally activate as the Division's force offering. The Division will synchronize all efforts along four lines of effort: Day 1 ILOC readiness, tactical and technical proficiency, retention and recruiting, and information.

In the execution of this operational approach, the Division will prioritize resources to support: 1) activations, 2) Exercise UNITAS in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, 3) Service level training events such as the Integrated Training Exercise, 4) other exercises, 5) Joint Fires Training, 6) and all other training. As it pertains to exercises other than UNITAS, exercises will be prioritized based on the supported unit in the following order: 1) MARFORSOUTH, 2) II MEF, 3) Marine Forces Special Operations Command, 4) Marine Corps Forces Europe/Africa, 5) Marine Corps Forces Pacific, 6) Marine Corps Forces Central Command, 7) and Marine Corps Forces North. These priorities may be changed by Commander MARFORRES or the Service but should be used as a guide when looking for training opportunities.



## LOE 1. Day 1 ILOC Ready

4MARDIV must be ready to augment and reinforce the Active Component with trained combat and combat support units. To accomplish this, Reserve Marines are generally limited to 38 training days per fiscal year, making it impossible for them to reach the same readiness levels as their Active Component counterparts. This is by design, and a key advantage to the Service. The Service saves resources by maintaining the Reserve Component at a lower readiness level but can still tap into a talented manpower pool that would otherwise be unable to serve due to civilian commitments. The Reserve Component is a low-cost, basically trained force that can be called upon when Active Component capabilities are not sufficient to meet requirements. Reservists can rapidly attain a commensurate level of proficiency with their Active Component counterparts when they activate by performing a relatively short intensive period of training at an ILOC before deployment. ILOC is determined at the Service level and frequently leverages Active Component I MEF and II MEF units to train and certify Reserve Forces for deployment. To ensure individuals and units can take full advantage of the short time at ILOC, 4MARDIV defined the minimum training levels required prior to ILOC. It is vitally important that these basic readiness requirements are met. This conserves precious ILOC training time when units have optimum access to their personnel, equipment, and training resources prior to deployment.









# LOE 2. Tactical and Technical Proficiency

Basic tactical and technical proficiency is necessary if Marines expect to accomplish the mission. No matter where a unit falls in the 4MARDIV Force Management Model, as delineated in the Division's Force Management Plan, the key to being effective is brilliance in the basics. At the Division level, tactical and technical proficiency is defined as proficiency in Marine Corps Common Skills 1000-level tasks. Individual units are free to add to this basic requirement based on their mission but must maintain this basic standard. Marines learn these skills in entry-level training and the followon schools that give them the specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that enable them to contribute as a member of a team. They are reinforced and built upon within 4MARDIV units, at Professional Military Education, and MOSspecific schools. They include simple tasks such as maintaining an individual weapon or using a compass.

An example, and one of the most fundamental skills that Marines must maintain proficiency in, is physical fitness. This skill takes time to build and is especially challenging to maintain while Marines are away from their units. Marines cannot simply become physically fit for a deployment or annual training period in a few days. Therefore, this skill must be maintained over time. Marines must train to this skill on their own to maintain readiness. Marine Corps Order recommends physical training consist of a combination of strength, endurance, and mobility training and directs that strength training be conducted twice a week. However, the Marines of the Division should strive to conduct various types of physical training five times a week, even if these sessions are brief. Doing so improves the overall health, physical fitness, and combat readiness of individual Marines and units. These basic skills allow units to conduct training in more advanced skills safely, and with better effect. They facilitate the employment of units for Service or Combatant Commander requirements prior to achieving full Day 1 ILOC readiness levels. Basic tactical and technical proficiency is the foundation. In 4MARDIV, Marines are all expected to maintain this basic level of proficiency regardless of a unit's place in their training continuum.

# LOE 3. Retain and Recruit

Marines of the Division are the most lethal weapon system in our arsenal. Therefore, 4MARDIV needs to retain the most qualified and well-trained Marines to function at the highest level possible. This requires leaders to communicate with their Marines and execute all retention requirements including required interviews. These interviews provide an additional opportunity for Commanders to speak with their Marines one-on-one to understand the issues and concerns throughout their command. Additionally, they provide a forum for engagement with a specific focus on retention. Specific to SMCR Marines, Commanders will leverage the Division's Talent Management network and marketplace to better inform Marines of career opportunities. Communication is imperative to understanding the issues that influence our retention efforts, and it provides another opportunity to educate Marines on the benefits of Reserve service, tangible and intangible.

Commanders will ensure they fully utilize their unit Career Planner. To be most effective, the Career Planner needs the opportunity to engage with the Marines regularly and have direct access to the command's leadership team. They need support from leadership, and like any Marine assigned a difficult mission, they need supervision and resources for success. Leaders should also make themselves familiar with retention initiatives. Career Planners are an excellent resource for regular briefings to build an understanding of Reserve Affairs initiatives and MARFORRES policies that affect the Total Force retention landscape. Units must also maintain a robust and effective welcome aboard and sponsorship program to ensure a Marine who checks in is not overwhelmed and lost to the complexity of Reserve service. Marines should be assigned sponsors for at least three months to help them navigate through the unit mission, requirements, and opportunities. Invest time in Marines and they will return that investment.







In addition to effective communication about career opportunities, Marines need to be challenged. A leading cause of attrition across the Force is the lack of MOS training for the individual Marine. The Service cannot compete with other services in areas of monetary incentives for our Marines, but we can offer them that same sense of pride and satisfaction they felt upon completion of Recruit Training or Officers Candidate School. They thrive when tested on their skills, determination, and leadership. They want to feel the reward of completing a demanding and meaningful task successfully. To that end, leaders should seek ways to construct training that not only accomplishes the mission, but also fosters Esprit de Corps. As units carry out such exercises, they not only prepare Marines for the future fight but also create the environment where Marines get to do what they love the most.

4MARDIV Marines are the face of the Marine Corps in many parts of the country due to the geographic dispersion of its units and the nature of Reserve Duty. Because of this placement, Reserve Marines are in a unique position to recognize talented and highperforming individuals that would make great Marines. When they recognize talent, they should encourage those men and women to contact the nearest Marine Corps Recruiter or Officer Selection Officer so they can potentially become Marines as well. It should be the goal of every Marine in the Division to recruit at least one Marine to either the Active or Reserve Component, per year. Who better to recognize individuals with the potential to be Marines than other Marines? Additionally, commands, are expected to communicate with the recruiting stations in their area to build an understanding of how they can help. This help may come in the form of providing Marines for recruiter's assistance, supporting poolee functions, or other events. Look for ways to assist the recruiting effort. The Service and the Nation will ben-

## **LOE 4. Information**

The information LOE is unique due to its omnipresence, adding importance to the actions Marines take because of the information it conveys. Adversaries constantly seek to gauge the preparedness of our Nation's military to inform their risk calculus. In the information environment, force readiness deters the Nation's adversaries. Specific to 4MARDIV units, this drives a high degree of Day 1 ILOC readiness and basic tactical and technical proficiency because these efforts enable the rapid generation of combat credible forces that can quickly augment and reinforce the Active Component after ILOC training. These efforts enable 4MARDIV units to play a strategic role in the information environment by displaying DOD's vast strategic and operational depth to adversaries.

Additionally, every exercise and Combatant Commander requirement filled by 4MARDIV units impacts allies and partners, informing their perception of the United States as a whole. Whether it be a five Marine Subject Matter Expert Exchange to the USSOUTHCOM area of operations or the deployment of a whole battalion in support of the Unit Deployment Program, a unit's positive interactions with allies and partners sends a message that mitigates adversary influence. 4MARDIV unit and individual preparedness, tactical actions, and mere presence in some cases, provides an effect that deters the Nation's adversaries.






Leadership, integration with the Active Component, and community involvement all convey important information regarding 4MARDIV Marines, Sailors, and units to the Service and the communities in which they live. A leader's everyday actions to inform Marines and Sailors are vital. They must recognize their important role in the Marine Corps and its value and significance. Additionally, ensuring appropriate audiences are informed of their Marines', Sailors', and unit's accomplishments remains critical to success because it builds trust and interest within the unit and community. Marines must also make certain that the value of the Reserve Component is understood within the Service. By building habitual relationships and seeking opportunities to train with Active Component counterparts, 4MARDIV units build the Active Component's confidence in Reserve Unit interoperability and readiness to augment. Finally, the efforts the Division undertakes working within local communities, participating in military funeral honors, and supporting Toys for Tots show solidarity and the desire to keep the faith, which highlights individual and unit contributions to local communities and the American public.


To these ends, leaders will familiarize themselves with this campaign plan and ensure every Marine and Sailor understands how they contribute to the success of the Division.

# **4MARDIV Force Laydown**

#### **Regimental Span of Control and Geographic Dispersion**



#### **Independent Battalions and Company Span of Control and Dispersion**



# **4MARDIV** Organization





-H&S (Camp Pendleton, CA)

-A Co (Camp Pendleton,

B Co (Ft. Detrick, M

D Co (Quantico, VA) -C Co (Boise, ID)

F Co (Eastover, SC)

E Co (Syracuse, NY)

-Site Support (Riverton, UT)

H&S (Baltimore, MD)

-A Co (Charleston, WV)

-H&S (San Antonio, TX)

-A Co (Alameda, Ca

-Det A Co (Kaneohe Bay HI) -B Co (Smyrna, GA)

C Co (Lynchburg, VA) B Co (Roanoke, VA)

D Co (Knoxville, TN)

-Eng Spt Co (Baltimore, MD) -E Co (Bessemer, AL)

-C Co (San Antonio, TX)

















HQ (Mobile, AL) 1st Platoon

**)**((

2nd Platoon

3rd Platoon

-HQ Btry (Grand Prairie, Tx)

-F Btry (Oklahoma City, OK) K Btry (Huntsville, AL)

-A Co (Battle Creek, MI)

-H&S (Selfridge, MI)

H&S (Ft. Devens, MA)

-B Co (Terre Haute, IN)

B Co (Londonderry, NH)

C Co (Buffalo, NY)

-G Co (Pico Rivera, CA) -Wpns Co (Port Hueneme CA)

A Co (Brunswick, ME)

-C Co (Lansing, MI)

-D Btry (El Paso, Tx)

B Co (Jacksonville, FL)

-C Co (Galveston, TX) D Co (Tampa, FL)

-A Co (Virginia Beach,

H&S (Tampa, FL)



-Wpns Co (Perrysburg, OH)

Wpns Co (Ft. Devens, MA)

-H Btry (Richmond, VA) -G Btry (Joint Base MDL HQ Btry (Bristol, PA)





HQ Btry (Seal Beach, CA N Btry (Seal Beach, CA) O Btry (Seal Beach, CA) -P Btry (Yakima, WA)

-Q Btry (Buckley AFB, CO)

-Comm Co (Cincinnati, OH) -Det Comm Co (Indianapolis, IN)

-AT Training Co (Broken Arrow, OK)



-K Co (N Versailles, PA) -I Co (Johnson City, TN) -H&S (Brook Park, OH) -L Co (Columbus, OH)



·H&S Co (Waukegan, IL)

H&S (Garden City, NY) E Co (Harrisburg, PA) F Co (Plainville, CT) G Co (Dover, NJ)



Wpns Co (Garden City, NY)



Wpns Co (N. Canton OH)

Truck Co (Erie, PA)

-Det Truck Co (Ebensburg, PA)










-C Co (Corpus Christi, TX) -Det C Co (Harlingen, TX) -B Co (Bossier City, LA) ·H&S (Houston, TX) -A Co (Houston, TX)

-F Co (Salt Lake City, UT) -Det F Co (Las Vegas, NV)

-E Co (San Bruno, CA) H&S (Pasadena, CA)





-L Co (Montgomery, AL) -I Co (North Little Rock AR) ·H&S (Bridgeton MO) -Wpns Co (Springfield, MO) -K Co (Smyrna TN)

-F Co (Milwaukee, WI)

E Co (Granger, IA)

-G Co (Madison, WI) Wpns Co (Joliet, IL)

-Det Truck Co (Baton Rouge, LA) -Truck Co (Las Vegas, NV)

4th Marine Division Organization

