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The Marine Corps today finds itself at a moment of historic inflection as we evolve to better meet our requirements within the context of national defense. The confluence of our withdrawal from decades of land campaigns associated with the Global War on Terrorism, geopolitical changes impacting the global landscape, and the fiscal austerity exacerbated by the COVID pandemic, have forced us to face a new reality: the influence and military advantage that the United States has earned and maintained for decades has eroded.

As expressed in recent Defense Planning Guidance and our Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the era of strategic competition with rivals such as China and Russia has not only threatened our military superiority in Europe and the Indo-Pacific but has resulted in increased competition for allies and partnerships throughout the globe. At no time in recent history has the future of U.S. global influence been less certain. Our most senior military leaders and elected officials agree that what is needed is a more lethal, resilient, agile, and innovative Joint Force. To that end, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps has emphasized that the Marine Corps is first and foremost a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and an extension of the Fleet that must be prepared to operate in contested maritime spaces—“the first on the scene, the first to help, the first to contain a brewing crisis, and the first to fight if required to do so.” While this endeavor is critical to success, equally imperative is that Marines are defined not by any capability, organizational structure, or piece of equipment but by “our collective character as Marines.” We must never forget that our ethos and culture are paramount to sustaining our future.

This moment in our Service’s history offers tremendous opportunity for redefining and explaining the role the Marine Corps plays in the defense of our Nation. Following more than two years of Force Design, the vision of the future Marine Corps Reserve has matured to the point that efforts can be made in earnest toward defining that end state. With the recent addition of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) mission and associated responsibilities, authorities, and resources, opportunities for Reserve Component integration with a specific geographic Combatant Commander are greatly expanded. While further developing our young leaders, this concerted effort will provide additional depth to the Marine Corps’ presence in the Western hemisphere while experimenting with and developing new, essential capabilities and tactics for our Corps.

This Campaign Plan has been developed as the means to that end, serving as a roadmap to guide the vast amount of intellectual energy applied toward its fulfillment. Most critical of all, it is a direct message to our non-obligated leaders within the Reserve Component. This is how we must evolve to win future battles. Your personal service and continued leadership is vital to our future success.

At the heart of this Plan lie three strategic themes we must adhere to: to be relevant, ready, and responsive. Nowhere will these themes have a more profound impact than with the deliberate alignment with II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) as part of the Marine Corps global contingency response force outside of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Further, this Plan introduces three broad trajectories, entitled Competition, Conflict, and Innovation, which, oriented to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of Operations in support of the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, serve as the focusing base movement of direction from which we pivot.

Once enacted, this Campaign Plan will articulate the details and drive the necessary actions required to achieve the Reserve Force of the future, as an integral part of the Marine Corps 2030 force envisioned by the Commandant. This will be our legacy.

Lieutenant General D. G. Bellon, USMC
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve
Commander, Marine Forces South

“But fight we must; and conquer we shall; in the end.”

~ Abraham Lincoln
INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Campaign Plan is three-fold: (1) to describe the roles and missions of the future Reserve Force in the context of CMC’s vision for the Marine Corps under Force Design 2030; (2) to provide a detailed roadmap, nested within Force Design, by which Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) aligns with and achieves this vision; and (3) to broadcast to the Total Force and the American people the level of commitment that MARFORRES has to modernizing the Reserve in support of the defense of our Nation.

At the core of this Plan lies a timeless foundation of Marine Corps cultural primacy that must prevail: the enduring nature of aggressive, junior leaders who are well trained and predisposed/empowered to take the fight to our nation’s enemies and win. Any distinction between Active and Reserve components at the individual Marine level is an irrelevant characteristic, but certain service level Reserve Component considerations are addressed through this Plan.

STRATEGIC THEMES

As introduced in the Foreword, three core principles guide the focus of this Campaign Plan – Relevant, Ready, Responsive.
RELEVANT

Multi-domain warfighting capability and capacity relevance remains an imperative guiding principle in the modernized Reserve Force. In the eyes of the Joint Force, obsolete or unnecessary capabilities and/or excess capacity is viewed as a drain on finite resources that are needed to build new capabilities and capacity. Even forces in an intentionally degraded state of combat readiness (i.e., tiered readiness) that are categorized as relevant can be brought up to full readiness within the Joint Force through the application of critical resources during the pre-deployment training process. Conversely, forces that are no longer operationally relevant are unlikely to ever be employed regardless of their readiness posture. These units will be transitioned over time to capabilities that will directly contribute to winning future battles. Examples of modern relevant capabilities include Cyber, Space, Precision Fires, Additive Manufacturing, Littoral Maneuver and Strike, and Reconnaissance/Counter-Reconnaissance. Capabilities considered not as relevant or employable in the future fight, such as conventional armor or heavy bridging, have been or will be divested.

READY

The Commandant’s vision for the future Reserve Force is to be “ready to mobilize” in support of Total Force requirements. This level of readiness requires a high level of administrative preparedness that enables a rapid activation of Marine Reservists individually or as part of a warfighting unit. This posture includes attainment of all Class I dental, vaccinations, legal, pay, and other ancillary administrative requirements. The speed to mobilize is paramount. A ready-to-mobilize unit can quickly muster and process its Marines through its Reserve Training Center and on to their Intermediate Location (ILOC) for subsequent required pre-deployment training. While training to unit Mission Essential Tasks (METs) throughout the year is ideal, inherent constraints associated with limited time competes with the demands of administrative readiness. We cannot afford to waste time mitigating administrative requirements at the ILOC at the expense of unit combat readiness. Post activation, training time is the most precious commodity a commander has prior to combat and cannot be spent on administrative tasks that could have been completed prior.

RESPONSIVE

To be responsive means to be agile, scalable, and tailorable to meet the requirements of the Gaining Force Commander. As the Service-retained pacing force, II MEF will drive requirements that enable the Reserve to be the force-of-choice for providing augmentation for contingency response to global threats outside of INDOPACOM. For example, should II MEF be directed to respond to an emerging crisis, Marine Forces Reserve must be prepared to source task-organized units within a tactically relevant time frame in order to bring combat capabilities to bear that will be required to either deter or contain the crisis, or if required, win battles.

These three strategic themes transcend Competition, Conflict, and Innovation in their application, which will be discussed within the Lines of Operation section.
ROLE OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN 2030

The Marine Corps Reserve, as part of the single integrated Total Force that CMC envisions, remains a vital contributor to the warfighting capability and capacity of the Naval Service. The ongoing Force Design modernization effort illustrates the commitment the Marine Corps has to sustaining a relevant and capable Reserve Force. As already expressed, the Marine Corps Reserve is focused not only on integrating with the AC across the competition continuum (which includes conflict) as required, but also on providing specialized and general-purpose conventional forces to II MEF in response to other global contingencies. Further, the Marine Corps Reserve is uniquely postured to partner with the Navy’s 4th Fleet in SOUTHCOM. This partnership will generate opportunities to first develop and then employ unique talent and skillsets that will contribute to a campaign of maritime competition as we enhance global maritime interoperability with our partners and allies.

ENDURING TENETS

I. Force Design is aggressively driving elements of both the AC and RC to concurrently transition legacy capabilities and formations over the next decade to the ready, agile naval expeditionary force-in-readiness needed for the future. Emerging technologies and maritime warfighting concepts have greatly informed the evolution of our redesign effort, and will continue to be developed to sustain our competitive advantage against our peer adversaries.

II. As an essential part of the single integrated Total Force, the RC provides trained and equipped joint capable combat-ready units and individuals to the Naval and Joint Force to meet global requirements throughout the competition continuum up to and including conflict. As a Service-retained force oriented toward II MEF, Marine Forces Reserve is ideally postured to continue to support Service priorities.

III. Organized, trained, and equipped much like the AC, the bulk of the RC force structure and capabilities mirror the AC at the unit of employment (e.g., Company, Detachment, etc.), facilitating interoperability and rapid expansion of the Total Force when required. Because of our integrated mission as part of a global contingency response force with II MEF, II MEF will be our partner as we organize, train, and equip the force at the tactical unit of employment level (up to the Battalion and Squadron level).

IV. The RC maintains a robust, highly trained, and talented manpower pool of more than 60,000 Marines within the Individual Ready Reserve. We will identify and invest in proven Marines who have the aptitude and desire to gain new, complex warfighting skills that might also enable robust civilian careers. Over time, these same Marines will represent some of our most vital warfighting capabilities and capacity as they develop enhanced skillsets through continued service with the Marine Corps Reserve along with parallel development in their civilian careers.

V. The RC plays a supporting role in global competition by sourcing exercises and facilitating relationships as indicated in the National Defense Strategy, creating competitive space, and building partnerships with operational commands such as II MEF, Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), and SOUTHCOM as part of steady state annual training.

VI. In their civilian capacity, many RC Marines work in Operations in the Information Environment (OIE)-relevant fields in high-tech, innovative, and emerging industries, influencing capabilities in the Defense and private sectors that typically outpace traditional DoD capability development and acquisitions. The Total Force will implement new pathways to cultivate high-potential Reserve Marines for critical OIE billets. Additionally, RC Marines in academia, think tanks, research organizations, the interagency, and industry serve as a bridge between these audiences and the Marine Corps, providing information networks, skills, and perspective to further the AC mission.

VII. The Marine Corps Reserve will continue to develop and sustain essential specialized unit capabilities such as Civil Affairs, Personnel Retrieval and Processing, Law Enforcement, Marine Corps Advisors, and airborne-capable ANGLICO units, providing operational depth and options to supported commanders. Further, operational logistics, fires coordination, air liaison, and OIE cells will augment the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander in support of the execution of Naval campaigns. Additionally, instructor and adversary air pilots continue to provide unique capabilities to support institutional level training requirements. These Reserve-unique capabilities represent low-cost, sustainable options for the Total Force, enabling the AC to invest its manpower and resources in higher priority capability requirements.

VIII. To enable AC units to execute any type of prescribed capability transition (e.g., deactivation, re-purposing, etc.), the RC can serve as a substitute force for any essential commitments. Given sufficient planning time, the RC will also be used to accelerate AC transition should the situation warrant it.
ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

The organizational architecture used with this Campaign Plan loosely models the operational approach defined by the Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design. Specifically, the use of Lines of Operation (LOO), Lines of Effort (LOE), and Key Objectives (KOs) are applied to graphically relate or depict the complex interaction of broad conceptual trajectories against more tangible categories of like missions/tasks, necessary to create the conditions to achieve stated objectives. In the context of this Plan, the three previously introduced LOOs – Competition, Conflict, and Innovation – define the orientation of the friendly force in relation to the enemy, in this case our DPG-named principal adversaries. Conversely, the four LOEs – Infrastructure, Talent Management, Capabilities & Capacity, and Utilization/Employment – are used to broadly categorize and link similar tasks and missions irrespective of specific references to an enemy. The relationship between LOOs and LOEs is not specifically one of dependence, rather it serves to complement the overall efforts to achieve the stated KOs. The KOs, as articulated within this Plan, are the discrete goals the Commander has determined to be necessary to achieve his stated vision. Figure 1 below illustrates the relationships between LOOs, LOEs, and KOs. Specific details and definitions of each are described later in this Plan.

With a more clear understanding of the future Reserve Force, the LOOs and LOEs will now be further defined as they relate to their supporting Key Objectives.

COMPETITION

The first Line of Operation to be described is Competition, arguably one of the more challenging and intangible concepts to define in the context of warfighting. In a traditional sense, competition is a fundamental component of international relations and occurs predominantly in the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic arenas. State and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, competing over control of finite resources for strategic advantage. The United States is entering a period of intensifying strategic competition with several rivals, both peer- and non-peer. It has become increasingly clear this competition will play out primarily below the threshold of major war and in the spectrum of competition that has become known as the gray zone. MCDP 1-4 describes “competition” - with great power adversaries as well as lesser challengers - as a continuum ranging from acts of purely non-violent interaction to the extremes of total war. Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger reinforces this point: “…war [with China] is not inevitable, but it will take an all-of-government approach to deter it.”

Our adversaries’ gray-zone victories will gradually amass into a direct threat to U.S. national security. This has driven the Department of Defense to adopt non-standard deterrence strategies with interagency and international partners to counter illegal gray-zone operations. Essential to our preparedness is our ability to persist both within a peer adversary’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) and throughout the global gray zone to “sense and make sense” of what is happening at any point on the competition continuum. This expanded reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance approach of actively contesting inside the Information Environment sets the conditions for success.
In accordance with the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, and Force Design 2030, “…it is imperative that we comprehensively adapt our forces to the demands of competition…in multiple domains.” Multi-domain operations involve integration across the Service, with allies, and partners in the warfighting domains: cyber, space, air, ground, and sea (and possibly human). The Service must, “…design a force purpose-built to compete with China…we must organize, train, equip, and posture capabilities for actions across the spectrum of competition in multiple theaters.”

All three elements of the competition continuum (cooperation, competition, and armed conflict) are not mutually exclusive (Joint Doctrine Note 1-19). The Marine Corps deters conflict through competition and a persistent naval presence, amplified through our coordination with allies and partners, while developing future partnerships that can influence a region. As stated in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, “…[we will] double down on building partnerships throughout the world, because our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts to address common challenges, share costs, and widen the circle of cooperation.”

To retain enduring relevance during naval campaigns in the context of all-domain activities, globally integrated operations must span the competition continuum. To fully accomplish the mission of either deterring or defeating an adversary if war were to break out, the U.S. must build on its relationships with regional allies, for which the Marine Corps and Reserve Force are well suited. This includes Mexico, Central America, and South America because our national interests are inextricably bound to the fortunes of our closest neighbors in the Americas.

Competition creates conditions to set the theater and complements conflict preparedness. Through this synergistic effect, competition enables readiness to be built, new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to be tested, and new warfighting doctrine and expertise to be developed. Competing makes the Reserve Force exceedingly relevant. The RC can contribute significantly with sustained operations across all domains within the competition phase as there exists the capacity to operate independently with conventional forces as well as capabilities organic only to the Reserve, which include civil affairs, personnel recovery and processing, military advisors, and law enforcement. The aforementioned structure will evolve, continuing to be more effective and relevant as the Service evolves in an era of strategic competition. Further, with renewed focus on the SOUTHCOM AOR, current requirements include security cooperation and competition activities while conducting operational requirements, deployments for training, and joint exercises, aimed to achieve and sustain strategic objectives. The Marine Corps Reserve will have the capacity and capabilities to support Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). These concepts combine the effects of sea-based and land-based fires, enabling our forces to mass combat power at times and places of our choosing should competition devolve into armed conflict.

There are a range of specific options the U.S. might employ in response to our adversaries’ gray-zone actions, including (but not limited to) military and informational responses. Military tools are relevant across the range of gray-zone threats, but would be especially important in the deterrent component of the strategy.

The RC deployments for training into the SOUTHCOM AOR can and will demonstrate the United States’ commitment to its allies and will serve as a means to compete with and impose cost on our adversaries. These deployment opportunities should directly support a sustained information campaign while seizing opportunities for joint, combined training, and military-to-military relationship building. The Reserve Force can also continue to reinforce regional partnerships and rehearse crisis responses without the permanent presence of forces through exercises such as UNITAS.
Activities and relationships in SOUTHCOM’s AOR will embody the essence of gray-zone competition, enabling desired outcomes that do not necessarily precipitate large-scale violent reactions by state and non-state adversaries. In collaboration with regional partners, allies, and other U.S. forces, information and well-reasoned actions will be used to influence perceptions and shape key decisions. Concurrently, timely recommendations from military and non-military entities will be used to influence adaptation to the changing conditions and emerging opportunities in the littoral areas of the maritime domain. The unwavering commitment to “say what we do and do what we say” will provide stark contrast to adversaries who rely on subterfuge and fear to misinform and coerce regional government officials and civilians.

To truly sustain deterrence and prevent competition from escalating into conflict, the U.S. must maintain its critical military advantages, including operating forward to deter coercive behavior and conventional aggression. All leaders are responsible for ensuring we are prepared, equipped, and trained to prevail in long-term strategic competition, win any potential fight, and preserve the future peace.

To that end, significant modernization and redesign of Marine Corps capabilities and capacity is required to develop a “stand-in force” capable of operating persistently inside the WEZ of China, our principal rival designated as our nation’s pacing threat for the next decade. Consequently, III MEF is designated as the main focus-of-effort stand-in force capability with a “fight-tonight” posture. Being geographically located within the first-island chain, III MEF is able to persist inside our adversary’s weapon systems threat range, designed to create a mutually contested space, facilitating the larger naval campaign in support of the Joint Force. I MEF will focus on supporting INDOPACOM and continue to provide forces, build partner capacity, and reinforce deterrence efforts, while also prepared to impose costs on peer and non-peer adversaries globally. However, should competition devolve into armed conflict, Marine Forces Reserve remains postured to support any Operational Plan (OPLAN)/Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) requirements or derivatives borne from them.
While Force Design focuses on meeting maritime and joint service requirements against a pacing threat, II MEF and Marine Forces Reserve remain “service-retained forces” tasked as the Service’s offering for global crisis and contingency response outside of INDOPACOM. Given the challenging resourcing environment, service-retained forces may not require the same capabilities that the Service’s primary mission compels for III and I MEF forces. However, Marine Forces Reserve will endeavor to contribute toward a single integrated force construct with II MEF as our pacing MEF for resources, capabilities, and requirements.

Marine Forces Reserve remains resourced and postured to produce small units of employment (Companies, Detachments, and below) and, subject to available time, can assemble, train, and deploy larger formations in support of Service requirements. To illustrate this point, Marine Forces Reserve could provide task organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capabilities to support combatant commander Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) objectives to reopen littorals from hostile forces in the vicinity of a key Sea Line of Communication.

Within INDOPACOM, Marine Forces Reserve will continue to support the Service’s unit deployment program as required in support of III MEF. This includes precision fires, of which the RC maintains approximately 50 percent of the Service’s capacity. In support of conflict, Marine Forces Reserve will sustain the ability to support the MEF within 30-45 days of notification for Company/Battery-level capabilities, and 60 days or greater of notification for Battalion level elements. Enduring actions in INDOPACOM Information domain such as Electro-Magnetic Spectrum management, IE battlespace awareness, cyberspace, and influence operations will also remain pillars of Marine Forces Reserve.

This construct illustrates the Reserve’s contribution to the success of service-retained force support to the Marine Corps’ 2030 global posture. Further, the alignment to II MEF facilitates Marine Forces Reserve’s ability to provide relevant, ready, and responsive forces to the Joint Force in support of maritime campaigning.
Despite the fact the term experimentation is mentioned 15 times in the CPG, successful experimentation in the Marine Corps will not be achievable with the current structure and system for innovation and experimentation resident within the Service. To innovate (i.e., develop and/or rapidly transition weapon systems, equipment, software, etc.), with associated TTPs, required to execute the vision of a technology-driven future force empowered to counter and defeat pacing threats, a new methodology and construct for innovation and experimentation will be necessary within the Marine Corps.

In concert with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Marine Forces Reserve is uniquely postured to exploit emerging concepts and technologies, and to address the need for robust and continuous innovation and experimentation across the major functional areas of the Marine Corps. Within the RC there are Marines who have unique skillsets developed in academia and/or the commercial sector that will be essential for Strategic Competition. This diverse talent can be leveraged to advance innovation for the Naval Services. To date, 4th Marine Logistics Group (MLG) has demonstrated great achievements as part of its innovation efforts, from Unmanned Aerial System delivery of blood and medicine by 4th Medical Battalion, to the San Jose Innovation Unit 3D-drone printing, to additive manufacturing and the smart glasses T-Glass concept for maintenance. These are excellent examples of what, when given the opportunity, Reserve Marines can offer the Service with respect to innovation efforts. Reserve Marines, with a dedicated innovation mission, can fully focus on experimenting with and developing TTPs for new equipment or systems and supporting the transition of those systems while also assisting the Service by better competing for Joint enabling resources and technology. There is still work to be done to ensure these Marines’ careers are not hindered as they work to solve some of the most complex problem-sets for the Service outside of their primary military occupational specialty (MOS). Innovation efforts are vital to the Service’s Force Design initiatives, and time spent in this area should not hinder future growth of talented Marines.

INNOVATION

“We have applied substantial energies to developing new concepts over the last two decades, but our ‘proofing’ of these concepts through rigorous wargaming, experimentation, and analysis has been inadequate. Such activities are essential if we are going to translate our concepts into action. We have a poor transition record in this regard, and our lack of sufficient analysis and experimentation is a major factor contributing to this deficiency.”

- Commandant’s Planning Guidance
In summary, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) clearly states the Marine Corps needs to transform itself to meet the demands of future warfare. Furthermore, the Commandant has identified experimentation as an area in dire need of improvement. The Marine Corps Reserve, thanks to its talented Marines, demographically favorable site laydown, access to specific Reserve-only funds, and integration with communities across the nation is uniquely suited to support MCWL, and the institution, in exploiting emerging concepts and technology. If employed and leveraged to the fullest extent, the Marine Corps Reserve will be critical in resolving the Naval Services’ most difficult challenge in instituting the transformation called for by the CPG. We will muster and focus the right talent, with the skillsets, in time to generate relative advantages required for victory against future foes. This LOO, executed by Marine Forces Reserve, will have far-reaching effects for the Service, the Joint Force, and the Nation.

Marine Forces Reserve is creating a robust Marine Innovation Unit capability that will harness critically relevant skillsets to benefit the Naval Services. This unit will partner with the MCWL to focus the deep talent pool of Reserve Marines to produce measurable, empirical results and products, through exploration, experimentation and concept of employment development of emerging technologies; inform requirements for, and acquisition of, new capabilities and emerging technology; and support the rapid transition of capabilities when appropriate. Through strategic partnerships with Joint-level rapid-acquisition and prototyping units, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, the Naval Services will leverage these initiatives, accelerate capability development, and strengthen joint warfighting concepts. This Marine Innovation Unit, once operationalized and fully mature, will provide a tremendous competitive advantage to the Service by capitalizing on the boundless potential of our Reserve Marines. Further, a properly conceived and executed Innovation LOO directly complements and enables both the Conflict and Competition LOOs: we must out-cycle our adversaries in all three areas to successfully compete and win. This new unit will be a critical first step.

In contrast to the consolidated regional laydown of the AC, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve units of Marine Forces Reserve represent a distributed force laydown, located at 158 sites across 47 states. Marine Forces Reserve owns 31 of these sites and is a tenant to various civilian or government agency landlords at the remaining 127. This distributed network offers a distinct advantage for both talent management and maintaining a tangible connection between the Marine Corps and the American people. Our 158 “Home Training Centers,” or HTCs, are the foundational home base on which RC individual and unit-level training and readiness efforts depend. These facilities are widely dispersed, frequently decades old, and often not tailor-built to support resident units or their assigned functions and tasks due to iterative capability changes made to the Reserve force over the last several decades. The combination of these attributes compels us to sharpen our focus on three key areas to ensure Marine Forces Reserve possesses the ability to effectively and efficiently conduct training and generate readiness well into the future.

INFRASTRUCTURE
Informed by shifting demographics, Marine Forces Reserve will develop a Siting Master Plan in coordination with Marine Corps Installations Command, other host commands, and by leveraging our partnerships with the Chief of Navy Reserve and Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command. Addressing force-wide facilities and infrastructure challenges through a synchronized and integrated decision cycle at the service-level, detailed operational planning at the force-level, and with a resource-informed focus on sustainment in conjunction with our supported units/commands, will improve the stability and enduring return on investments. In this environment of reduced funding, continued coordination with host commands to optimize site and infrastructure footprints through consolidation, space management, and elimination of excess or failing facilities is crucial. Additionally, Marine Forces Reserve Facilities will provide oversight in the prioritization of capital investments, with priority to critical infrastructure. Continual refinement of our facilities investment strategy through the Installation Infrastructure Investment Board governance and supporting processes will serve to balance the portfolio supporting basic requirements at lowest total life cycle costs.

Additionally, the dispersed and aging nature of our HTCs compounds the challenge of maintaining and implementing network connectivity, security, and modernization initiatives critical to today’s garrison and operational communication requirements. The rapid pace at which requirements evolve associated with operating and defending the Marine Corps network requires significant experience and capacity at Marine Forces Reserve and its Major Subordinate Commands. Resilient and reliable communication capability is non-negotiable for Marine Forces Reserve to be able to effectively train and mobilize. To that end, Marine Forces Reserve will work in coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Information and Marine Forces Cyber Command to ensure Reserve units and individuals are able to access systems and tools needed to accomplish their assigned mission wherever they may be.

Additionally, the dispersed and aging nature of our HTCs compounds the challenge of maintaining and implementing network connectivity, security, and modernization initiatives critical to today’s garrison and operational communication requirements. The rapid pace at which requirements evolve associated with operating and defending the Marine Corps network requires significant experience and capacity at Marine Forces Reserve and its Major Subordinate Commands. Resilient and reliable communication capability is non-negotiable for Marine Forces Reserve to be able to effectively train and mobilize. To that end, Marine Forces Reserve will work in coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Information and Marine Forces Cyber Command to ensure Reserve units and individuals are able to access systems and tools needed to accomplish their assigned mission wherever they may be.

A final infrastructure focus area as the Reserve Force looks to the future is the increasing security classification levels at which some activities, training, and operations must be performed. While the Reserve Force continues to leverage existing secure facilities on major installations or Joint Regional Intelligence Centers wherever possible, Marine Forces Reserve will need to explore methods to expand its footprint of or access to, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities and Special Access Program (SAP) Facilities. In coordination with Headquarters Marines Corps and other service stakeholders, Marine Forces Reserve will proactively plan and resource, where able, the secure facility requirements in support of select critical Reserve capability areas. Relevance in some warfighting functional areas will not be achievable in the future if Reserve Marines are not able to work, train, and in some cases, be employed from these types of facilities.
In coordination with the Navy Reserve, MARFORRES will optimize the physical laydown of the Marine Corps Reserve in a fiscally responsible and operationally tenable manner to maximizing readiness while mitigating risk to the service.

Refreshing the physical network infrastructure of MARFORRES will greatly improve accessibility to cloud access points, thereby providing greater reliability and capability of voice, video, and data services.

Greatly expanding the SAP/Special Technical Operations (STO) infrastructure within MARFORRES further enables integration into future Marine Corps operations and planning efforts, while supporting future capability requirements.

Details in support of these KOs can be found in Appendix A.

To pursue and make substantial progress on this infrastructure LOE and its primary challenge areas, three priority KOs are identified to focus and align staff action.

NAVAL SITE OPTIMIZATION/SITING MASTER PLAN
In coordination with the Navy Reserve, MARFORRES will optimize the physical laydown of the Marine Corps Reserve in a fiscally responsible and operationally tenable manner to maximizing readiness while mitigating risk to the service.

SAP/STO INFRASTRUCTURE
Greatly expanding the SAP/Special Technical Operations (STO) infrastructure within MARFORRES further enables integration into future Marine Corps operations and planning efforts, while supporting future capability requirements.

NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE (MCEN/SIPR)
Refreshing the physical network infrastructure of MARFORRES will greatly improve accessibility to cloud access points, thereby providing greater reliability and capability of voice, video, and data services.
Details in support of these KOs can be found in Appendix A.

TALENT MANAGEMENT
Earning victory in the increasingly complex and multi-domain warfighting realm of the future requires our Marines to achieve and maintain an advanced level of technical, intellectual, and physical capability, and to operate comfortably in progressively more distributed and ambiguous environments. To meet this demand, Marine Forces Reserve will prioritize the identification, management, and development of talent, and the corresponding investment in our greatest asset: our individual Marines.

The Marine Corps of the future will require significantly more low-density/high-demand skillsets that are difficult to achieve and retain, particularly if we continue to rely so heavily on the AC. The RC must play a larger role in attracting and retaining this unique talent and skill, while also providing a path to service more compatible for our Reserve Marines who choose to maintain a concurrent civilian career in conjunction with military duty. Moving forward, Marine Forces Reserve will develop innovative policies, pathways, and tools designed to capture, catalogue, and maintain visibility of this pool of talent while seeking creative ways to incentivize, recruit, and retain Marines with the aforementioned high-demand skills. It is critical we make certain that our exceptionally talented Marines have a path for future service, ensuring that when needed, the right talent is readily available and accessible to compete and win in any conflict.
Talent management, as an LOE, is not solely about attracting and retaining specialized skillsets, but rather it is more broadly about developing the best people and ensuring they have the right opportunities to contribute to the Corps. Reserve Marines have many options. In most cases, they are as valuable to their civilian employers as they are to the Marine Corps. Their continued service as a Marine, however, is their choice and one that is often considered counter-intuitive, amounting to an “irrational call to service.” Marine Forces Reserve along with the AC will become, in the Commandant’s words, “the most innovative and revolutionary thinkers, the most well-disciplined and accountable force,” through this dedicated effort to revolutionize the way the Reserve manages talent.

Informed by successful solutions recently developed throughout the Joint Force, and in partnership with Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Forces Reserve will develop and implement policies, more intuitive systems, and processes that provide transparency to each Marine on the full spectrum of RC participation opportunities available to them. Marines should be unambiguously made aware of, and be permitted to apply for, the full menu of RC opportunities based on their rank, MOS, and special skillsets. Similarly, there should be an unbiased method of selecting the most qualified candidates for each Reserve opportunity, thus matching interested talent against valid requirements. The current system, largely reliant upon an individual’s network, is not good enough for our individual Marines, nor does it allow for predictable and scalable offerings of the potential for a MARSOC-oriented SMCR capability and/or structural options to explore related AC/RC talent in MARSOC formations. This work involves coordinating training and exercise employment plans that integrate specific RC capabilities (e.g., CAG, LE BN, ANGLICO, etc.). These efforts will inform an analysis of the potential for a MARSOC-oriented SMCR capability and/or structural options to explore related AC/RC permeability for high-op-tempo, demanding MOSs in order to retain critical skillsets.

As described earlier, II MEF is the primary “pacing force” to which RC capabilities and capacity requirements are aligned. This approach also recognizes the RC will not necessarily mirror, resource, and field III-MEF / EABO-oriented capabilities. It enables the Service to leverage and employ the experience, technical proficiency, and talent resident within the RC to support II MEF warfighting functional areas where demand exceeds capacity. As II MEF continues to train, exercise, experiment, and wargame against global contingency response force scenarios and requirements, Marine Forces Reserve will stay tightly linked to their efforts and will provide maximum support to ensure this Service Retained Forces partnership delivers what the Commandant directed.

Additionally, the dual-hatting of Commander, MARFORRES as Commander MARFORSOUTH facilitates the employment of current and future RC capabilities and capacities as part of the Service’s support to SOUTHCOM requirements. The relative close geographic proximity of much of the SOUTHCOM AO to the continental United States, makes it a highly viable location for RC forces to conduct meaningful training and exercises. Increasingly routine use of RC forces in this AOR supports SOUTHCOM efforts to compete with our adversaries in the region, while developing deeper working relationships with our allies and partners. Furthering this win-win arrangement, RC Forces competing, exercising, and experimenting in this AO will be increasingly ready and able to support the broader challenges and Service requirements associated with global competition and II MEF-led global contingency response force requirements.

The ability of RC forces to integrate into II MEF-led global contingency response force service offerings as well as Service requirements in support of SOUTHCOM will be furthered by RC efforts to focus on high-potential partnerships. Work is underway with MARSOC to explore high return methods of integrating and retaining RC talent in MARSOC formations. This work involves coordinating training and exercise employment plans that integrate specific RC capabilities (e.g., CAG, LE BN, ANGLICO, etc.). These efforts will inform an analysis of the potential for a MARSOC-oriented SMCR capability and/or structural options to explore related AC/RC permeability for high-op-tempo, demanding MOSs in order to retain critical skillsets.

CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY

MARFORRES’ mission as part of a Global Contingency Response Force in close coordination with II MEF requires a RC organized, trained, and equipped, at the tactical unit of employment and staffed with well-trained, aggressive Marines and Sailors ready to take the fight to the enemy.
A second high potential partnership is with Chief of the Navy Reserve/Commander, Navy Reserve Forces (CNR/CNRF). MARFORRES’ goal is to establish closer relationships and collaborative planning efforts to identify integration opportunities, while removing obstacles to generating USMCR/USNR warfighting readiness. There are numerous capabilities within our Services that offer opportunities for joint RC ventures. These include logistics distribution, civil-military operations, engineering, and riverine/small boat/patrol craft operations, to name a few, where significant potential for new and creative constructs such as blended crews consisting of Active and Reserve Component members from the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, conducting coordinated training, exercises, and experimentation are possible. MARSOC integration and a forward-looking partnership with the Navy Reserve are essential to retaining and leveraging critical RC talent and expertise in numerous high demand-low density areas and are a MARFORRES priority.

As Marine Forces Reserve aligns with II MEF to inform analysis and insight into RC capability and capacity requirements, a deeper partnership will also be pursued with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory/Futures Directorate (MCWL/FD). In support of this effort, one of MARFORRES’ highest priorities is to provide RC advanced technical innovation capacity in direct support of MCWL/FD through establishment of a Marine Innovation Unit. This unit, as well as broader innovation efforts, will inform new and innovative means to educate, train to, and achieve redefined Reserve readiness standards in a resource-constrained environment. Modernizing the models associated with Training and Readiness will ensure faster and more efficient mobilization, and better trained and educated leaders who will ultimately provide a more versatile and lethal force. In summary, relevant Reserve capabilities and capacity consisting of talented, well-trained, ready-to-mobilize Marines are the overarching goal of this LOE. To pursue and make tangible progress in this LOE, several KOs are identified to focus and align staff action.

CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY - CONTINUED

Provide Marine Forces Reserve leadership with analytical and empirical evidence and data necessary to increase the speed and quality of risk-informed decision-making. This effort will establish clear objectives, capture data, and assess and adjust as required.

MARINE INNOVATION UNIT

Reserve Marines in academia, think tanks, research organizations, the interagency, and industry, can serve as a bridge between the Marine Corps and Department of Defense capability development and acquisition efforts. Design and implementation of the Marine Innovation Unit will enable these efforts.

TRAINING AND READINESS MODEL MODERNIZATION

Develop and implement a plan focused on modernization of all major drivers of training and readiness to better position the force to be more responsive, adaptive, and better prepared to meet the challenges of the future. Find innovative means to educate, train to, and achieve redefined Reserve readiness standards with limited resources. Details in support of these KOs can be found in Appendix C.

FORCE PLANNING (RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND DETS BY MAGTF ELEMENT)

Orient on II MEF as the primary “pacing force” to which RC capabilities and capacity are designed to complement and support in competition and conflict with adversaries outside the USINDOPACOM AOR. Leverage RC talent and capacity in support of II MEF, SOUTHCOM, MARSOC, and the Service’s innovation and modernization related wargaming, experimentation, exercise, and learning activities.

NEW PLATFORMS AND TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION

Participate as a full partner with sustained Marine Forces Reserve presence in all Capability Portfolio Integration Board, Capability Portfolio Requirements Board, and Program Objective Memorandum planning events. Ensure appropriate subject matter experts are present and prepared to inform discussions and decisions impacting the RC and develop RC capability and capacity options.

MCWL PARTNERSHIP

Establish formal relationship with MCWL/FD and between key leaders across MCWL/FD and Marine Forces Reserve staffs in order to open a more direct channel for MCWL to access and leverage RC talent and capacity in support of planned events/objectives.

USN/USNR CAPABILITY INTEGRATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

Pursue the naval integration themes associated with recently published strategic guidance (Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, DPG, CPG, and Force Design annual reports).
UTILIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT

This LOE collectively describes the physical manifestation of the use of Reserve forces in the future operating environment. As the strategic and operational environment changes, the Marine Corps must transition from the land-based rotational force of the past two decades to a trained and equipped naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. The Marine Corps Reserve must be prepared to support this transition beyond its traditional role of “augment and reinforce” the AC. As U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) and their assigned forces work to become a credible deterrent to adversary aggression in the Pacific, Marine Forces Reserve will provide operational forces through the unit deployment program to enable I and III MEF to transition and modernize. While providing the AC with time to transition as well as forces that support stand-in force capabilities and long-range precision fires (e.g., HIMARS), our deployed units of employment will achieve levels of readiness exceeding that which is normally attained during a 38-day Reserve training year.

While MARFORPAC, I MEF, and III MEF focus on the INDOPACOM AOR, the Marine Corps must remain a global force. This means as the Marine Corps evolves into the Force of 2030, the role of global response force for other combatant commanders will be fulfilled by reliance on II MEF and Marine Forces Reserve. While II MEF will be the immediate response force, Marine Forces Reserve will be poised to rapidly provide niche capabilities and follow-on forces. Additionally, II MEF and Marine Forces Reserve remain Service-retained forces. Marine Forces Reserve will partner with II MEF and MARSOC to maximize training opportunities enabling seamless integration of Reserve Forces into the AC for training and operations as well as seeking opportunities for professional staff development for our field grade officers and staff non-commissioned officers.

While the primary focus is the pacing threat, the Marine Corps must remain engaged in global competition with our adversaries; Marine Forces Reserve will seek opportunities to engage in deployments that meet theater combatant commander requirements and improve unit training requirements via the Global Force Management/Force Synchronization process. Marine Forces Reserve will continue to provide global OPLAN/CONPLAN support and simultaneously coordinate deployments and engagements throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR. SOUTHCOM provides unique opportunities to compete with our adversaries. Deployments and exercises in SOUTHCOM provide Marine Forces Reserve units the chance to rehearse mobilization processes and conduct mission essential task training that forces our pacing threat to react. SOUTHCOM also provides environmental training opportunities that are not available to Marine Forces Reserve units in CONUS or not conducive to the Reserve annual training (AT) schedules (e.g., jungle warfare training, cold weather training in Chile during summer AT season in the U.S.).

Finally, Marine Forces Reserve units must be ready to activate when the nation calls. To prepare for this, every exercise and annual training event will serve as a mobilization rehearsal, from tactical unit to the Force level. Equally important is the Total Force integration once Reserve Forces are deployed. Marine Forces Reserve will partner with Plans, Policies & Operations to ensure the Service conducts Total Force mobilization exercises that include the activation, integration, and deployment of Reserve units.
Global Force Management
Through the GFM process, USMCR capacity will be leveraged to allow the AC to resource higher priority Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) requirements.

OPLANs/CONPLANs
As the GCCs modernize their deliberate plans for future conflict, Marine Forces Reserve will ensure that USMCR warfighting units are appropriately represented against Joint Force requirements.

Experimentation and Wargaming Support
In coordination with the MCWL, Marine Forces Reserve will seek opportunities to develop and mature RC capabilities, while providing capacity to enable Service-level initiatives requiring wargaming support.

MARSOC Integration
Through a deliberate partnership, Marine Forces Reserve resources can be integrated and employed to offset MARSOC limitations in organic structure, while also mitigating capability and capacity gaps for both training and operational requirements.

MARFORSOUTH Integration
The synergy derived from a dual-Command leverages the vast and diverse capabilities within Marine Forces Reserve for limited utilization and engagement within the USSOUTHCOM AO and better postures the naval force for adversary competition within this hemisphere.

II MEF Integration
As Service Retained Forces along with II MEF, Marine Forces Reserve will be postured to provide required capabilities and capacity to meet Combatant Commander global crisis response requirements.

Details supporting these KOs can be found in Appendix D.
CONCLUSION

Implementation of this starts **now**.

As the operational environment will most assuredly change, our organization must embrace our ability to adapt to and triumph over any and all challenges this change presents to us. Furthermore, we must remember and take pride in our timeless legacy of profound resilience in the face of adversity, on and off the battlefield.

While Force Design continues to mature and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance evolves over time, the Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort as detailed in this Campaign Plan will remain constant, while our Objectives evolve to meet these ever-changing challenges, whatever they may be.

Subordinate commanders must ensure their planning efforts support the Lines of Operation and Effort, which are designed to help achieve the stated Key Objectives. Equally important, all leaders must ensure their Marines understand the “why” that is driving both the change to the operational environment, and our response.

As a warfighting organization, the key to our success has been and will continue to be the individual Marine. This principal ideology lies at the heart of our institutional culture and must survive if the Marine Corps is to remain relevant to the Nation. Consequently, our Marines, both young and old, will provide the collective intellect and energy to the realization of this vision. Again, this will be our legacy.

~ Alexander the Great

Lieutenant General D. G. Bellon, USMC
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve
Commander, Marine Forces South
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Infrastructure Key Objectives
Appendix 2: Talent Management
Appendix 3: Capabilities & Capacity
Appendix 4: Utilization & Employment
Appendix 5: Communication Plan
Appendix 6: Campaign Plan Execution Order

These documents are located in the MARFORRES Sharepoint.